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PATERNITY CASES
The writing of this article was prompted by the challenge a paternity
case presents to counsel and the trier of the fact, judge or jury, and by
the growing importance of the problem of illegitimacy. Frequently, the
trial of these suits falls on the shoulders of young lawyers. This is due
to the fact that he is often appointed as guardian ad litem for a minor
defendant, or as counsel for an indigent defendant.
Long ago Lord Hale stated, in reference to the act which gives rise
to the paternity action, that the "accusation is one easily made, hard to
prove, and still harder to be disproved by one ever so innocent.", The
act is one of "darkness and secrecy," one in which the parties are rarely
surprised in committing. Ordinarily it must be established by circum-
stantial evidence.2
Although this article is not concerned with the social aspects of the
problem of illegitimacy, the statement that it is of growing importance
requires a few words of explanation.
The trend in the national illegitimacy rate over the past tventy-five
years has generally been upward. From 1940 to 1957 there was an in-
crease in the illegitimacy rate from 7.1 to 20.9 illegitimate births per
1,000 unmarried women 15 to 44 years of age. From 1957 to 1964 the
rate increased by 12 per cent to 23.4 per 1,000.
In 1964 an estimated 275,700 illegitimate live births occurred. Al-
most seven per cent of all live births were illegitimate. While 40 per
cent of such births occur to women under the age of 20, the sole reason
that unmarried teenagers bear a larger number of illegitimate children
than women of other ages is that there are more of them. It is believed
that the number of illegitimate births will continue to increase even
if the rate remains stable because of the rising number of women of
child bearing ages.3
The incidence of illegitimacy in Wisconsin is similar to that exper-
ienced across the nation. The total out-of-wedlock births increased in
the state from 1,895 in 1954 to 3,906 in 1965. 4 Approximately 4.7 per
cent of all live births in the state in 1965 were out-of-wedlock. Milwau-
kee County accounted for almost 43 per cent of all out-of-wedlock
births. Although 76 per cent of such births in the state were Caucasian,
the rate for "non-white" is about seven times higher than the rate for
the "white" population. In recent years the out-of-wedlock live birth
'Cleveland v. State, 211 Wis. 565, 248 N.W. 408 (1933) ; Wilcox v. State, 102
Wis. 650, 78 N.W. 763 (1899); State v. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482, 59 N.W. 479(1894).
2 Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235 (1872).3 Monthly Vital Statistics Reports, 15 DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE No. 3 (June 1966); Herzog, The Chronic Revolution: Births Out of
Wedlock, 5 DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE No. 2 (Feb. 1966).
4 Ws. BOARD OF HEALTH, REPORTS OF BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS (1965). The
reported figures are not considered complete because: some illegitimate births
may not be registered at all, others may be concealed through falsified birth
records, and a number are not reported as illegitimate in cases of married
women even though the husband is not the father.
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rate has increased more rapidly for the white population. The total
increase results from the increase in the number of young females of
child-bearing age born during the post-war birth boom. 5
Females aged 15 to 19 years accounted for nearly 44 per cent of all
such births in the State of Wisconsin. Such births tend to concentrate
in the lower socio-economic group regardless of race or nationality.
In a high proportion of the cases which reach the courts, the youthful-
ness and social background of the parties causes them to be unsophisti-
cated and inarticulate. This adds to trial problems.
In Milwaukee County approximately 1,000 to 1,200 cases have been
presented to the courts each year during the past four or five years.
Much of such litigation is generated by the offices which administer aid
to dependent children and the Corporation Counsel's office in an effort
to recover monies paid out as aid to dependent children and services to
such mothers.6 In Milwaukee County the distribution of non-white to
white cases runs about two to one.7 The fact that approximately
$2,500,000 was paid out in 1965 for the support of illegitimate children
and for medical services to the mothers illustrates the problem to the
community.8
The determination of the child's paternity is important to the child.
Although he is deprived of a normal childhood, homelife, parental care,
support, and rearing, filiation will place a duty to support upon the
father, give the child some right of inheritance, and provide the father
with a right to seek custody.9 At the present time his sole remedy is
through paternity proceedings, 10 from which these rights flow upon de-
termination of paternity. Although the father's conduct may be tortious,
the child cannot recover from him for being deprived of a normal home
or for the stigmatization resulting from illegitimacy."
5 Wis. BOARD OF HEALTH, REPORT OF BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, (1963).
6 In 1965 there were 1333 referrals by the Department of Public Welfare to the
Corporation Counsel's office. For various reasons, all do not result in the
issuance of warrants.
7In 1964, 65% of those cases in which paternity was established were non-
white. MILw. COUNTY COURT, CIVIL DIVISION, REPORT OF TRUSTEES DIVISION,
(1964).
8 The enforcement program administered by the County Courts-Civil Division
in 1965 refunded some $333,000 to the Department of Public Welfare col-
lected from the fathers of those children. There were certain other refunds
to the Milwaukee County Institutions and Departments for lying in and medi-
cal services rendered. In addition there was partial recovery of court costs.
9 At common law the father of an illegitimate child had no duty to support the
child, nor did he have any right to custody. The child had no right to inherit
from the father. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 348-354 (1931).
WIS. STAT. §52.37 (1965), requires the adjudicated father to support the child
from birth until the child is 18 years of age. WIs. STAT. §52.21(2) (1965),
adopted in 1963 (Laws of Wis. 1963, ch. 426) permits the court to make
custody orders in favor of the father as in divorce cases. WIs. STAT. §237.06
provides that an illegitimate child shall be considered as an heir of his mother,
and of his father who has been so adjudicated, or who has acknowledged his
fatherhood in open court or in writing signed in the presence of a witness.
10 WIS. STAT. §52.21-45 (1965).
11 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963) ; Note, 18 STAN.
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PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
There are two preliminary considerations of which counsel must be
aware when handling a paternity suit. First, the proceedings are statu-
tory in origin and must be tried in the manner fixed by the Legislature.22
Consequently, certain special rules must be considered. Second, to under-
stand the existing case law, counsel must realize that until 1957 the
hybrid character of these proceedings caused great confusion concerning
procedural rules. To the characteristics of the proceedings which had
counterparts in criminal law, criminal practice was applied. Civil pro-
cedure rules covered the remainder of the proceedings.13 In 1957 the
Legislature denominated the proceedings to be "civil special proceedings"
and provided that they were to be conducted according to the statutes
applying to civil proceedings except as otherwise provided. 4 Much of
the case law has been overruled by specific legislative provision.
FORM OF TRIAL, ISSUES, BURDEN OF PROOF
The primary purpose of the proceeding is to determine whether the
defendant is the father of the complainant's child.' 5 Once that is es-
tablished, separate hearings are held to determine the amount the father
shall pay for support until the child is eighteen years of age and, in
some instances, who shall have custody of the child. By statute the
proceeding is civil and rules of civil procedure, including rules of
evidence, apply.""
Section 52.35 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that the main issue
shall be whether the defendant is or is not the father of the complainant's
child. If the child was born to the complainant while she was the lawful
wife of a specified man, there shall be determined first the issue of
whether the husband was not the father of such child. This issue is in
the negative because the husband is not a party to the suit.
The complainant has the burden of proving both issues by a clear
and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence.' 7 Prior to 1957 paternity
had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.' 8 In 1957 the burden
L. REv. 531 (1966) ; 28 ALBANY L. REV. 174 (1964); Note, 13 DEPAUL L. REv.
320 (1964); Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1964); Comment, 49 IoWA L. REv.
1005 (1964) ; Note, 25 OHIO ST. L. J. 145 (1964); Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 780 (1964) ; Note 2 DUQUESNE L. REv. 125 (1963). But cf. Williams v.
State, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965) where a motion to dismiss a complaint
was denied where an infant bastard sued the Manhattan State Hospital for
negligently permitting a fellow patient to rape the mother while both were
confined, which act resulted in the child's birth. Note, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 127
(1966) ; Note, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 438 (1966) ; Note, 18 STAN. L. REv. 531
(1966).
12 State ex rel. Sowle v. Brittich, 7 Wis.2d 353, 96 N.W.2d 337 (1959); State
ex rel. Lang v. Civil Court, 228 Wis. 411, 280 N.W. 347 (1938).
13 State ex rel. Sowle v. Brittich, supra note 12.
'4 Laws of Wis. 1957, ch. 296.
'5 Francken v. State, 190 Wis. 424, 209 N.W. 766 (1926).
16 WIs. STAT. §52.45 (1965).
17 WIS. STATS. §§52.355, 891.39 (1965).
1s Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952) ; State v. Bishop, 255 Wis.
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of proof was changed by the Legislature to require "clear and satisfac-
tory evidence, which shall be greater than a clear preponderance of
evidence required in other civil cases, but which shall be less than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.. . ."19 The burden, if the complainant
was the lawful wife of another, remained beyond all reasonable doubt.
Chapter 298 of the Laws of Wisconsin of 1959 created the present
standards. The regulation of the burden of proof by the Legislature is
procedural, therefore defendant has no vested right in a prior rule and is
governed by the rule in effect at the time of trial. 0 The mere fact that
the trial court erroneously gave the defendant the benefit of an instruc-
tion requiring a greater burden than prescribed by law will not upset a
finding of paternity because he has not been prejudiced. 2'
The trial shall be by jury or the court. A jury trial must be de-
manded in writing within 20 days after the preliminary examination;
however, the court has the discretion to subsequently order a jury trial.
The same rules which apply to legislative changes governing the pro-
cedure by which a jury trial can be obtained or waived apply in the case
of changes of burden of proof.22 Section 52.35 which provides that a
failure to make a written demand within the time required constitutes
a waiver of the right is not an unreasonable regulation.
Because the procedure is civil the five-sixths verdict rule applies.
It has been held that if a sealed verdict is defective or the jury, upon
polling, refuses to affirm it, the jury may be sent out for further delib-
eration. A fuller or different verdict will be good even though the jury
had separated. 23 A stipulation to proceed with eleven jurors because of
the death of the mother of one of the jurors during the trial does not
render the verdict illegal. In a civil case the defendant may waive strict
adherence to the statutory or common law rules of proceeding. 24
The judge may, in his discretion, exclude the public from attendance
at such trials.
25
If the mother dies, becomes insane, or cannot be found within the
jurisdiction, or fails to continue to prosecute after the proceeding
has been commenced the child shall be substituted as the complainant
and the case shall be prosecuted by the district attorney. The testimony
of the mother at the preliminary may be read in evidence insofar as it
is competent, relevant, and material.2 6 The court may proceed to judg-
416, 39 N.W.2d 399 (1949).; Schuh v. State, 221 Wis. 180, 266 N.W. 234
(1936) ; Van Tassel v. State, 59 Wis. 351, 18 N.W. 328 (1884); Baker v.
State, 47 Wis. 111, 2 N.W. 110 (1879) ; Zweifel v. State, 27 Wis. 396 (1871).19 Laws of Wis. 1957, ch. 296.
20 State ex rel. Kapusta v. Weir, 12 Wis.2d 96, 106 N.W.2d 292 (1960) ; State
ex rel. Sowle v. Brittich, 7 Wis.2d 353, 96 N.W.2d 337 (1959).
21 State ex rel. Kurtz v. Knutson, 5 Wis.2d 609, 93 N.W.2d 348 (1958).
22 State ex rel. Sowle v. Brittich, 7 Wis.2d 353, 96 N.W.2d 337 (1959).
23 State ex tel. Volkman v. Waltermath, 162 Wis. 602, 156 N.W. 623 (1916).
24 Rindskopf v. State, 34 Wis. 217 (1874).
25 WIs. STAT. §52.35 (1965).
26 Ibid.
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ment without the presence of the defendant if he fails to appear after
proper notice.
2 7
Both parties are competent to testify.2 The common law restriction
against a mother of a child born in wedlock from testifying to
non-access by the husband is removed by section 328.395. Although
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not ruled upon the point, the trial
courts in Milwaukee County have constantly held that the defendant
may be called adversely to testify because the action is a civil action.
This is in accord with the general rule in other jurisdictions which hold
that paternity proceedings are civil in nature.29
Upon cross examination the defendant may be asked if he had
sexual intercourse with the complainant during the conceptive per-
iod even though no questions were asked by his counsel upon direct
examination with respect to this matter. In State ex rel. Burns v. Ver-
non the defendant on direct examination confined his testimony to the
effect that he had broken up with the complainant and was absent from
the state when the conception allegedly occurred.30 The question was
permitted upon the theory that the right of cross examination of a
party as distinguished from a witness is not to be restricted to the
narrow limits of direct examination, and a wide scope of inquiry re-
lated to the matter at issue is to be allowed.31
The question concerning the right of the defendant to refuse to
answer questions is another matter. It has been held in Wisconsin
that the trial judge in a paternity suit has the right, if not the duty,
to instruct a witness of his right to refuse to answer upon the
grounds that his answer may tend to incriminate him. 32 The privi-
lege may be invoked in civil proceedings as well as criminal, but the
testimony which is proscribed must relate to criminal liability rather
than civil.33 It must be asserted personally.3 4 The witness's statement
invoking the privilege is not conclusive upon the court, but he should
not be compelled to answer unless it is reasonably clear that his answer
cannot tend to incriminate him.35 The answer alone need not be
sufficient to support a conviction but need only be a link in the chain
of evidence to be protected.36
27 Baker v. State, 47 Wis. 111, 2 N.W. 110 (1879).
28 McClellan v. State, 66 Wis. 335, 28 N.W. 347 (1886).
29 Territory v. Lamier, 40 Hawaii 65 (1953); State v. Jeffrey, 198 Minn. 476,
247 N.W. 692 (1933) ; State v. McKay, 54 N.D. 801, 211 N.W. 435 (1926).
30 26 Wis.2d 563, 133 N.W.2d 292 (1965).
31 Sprague v. State, 188 Wis. 432, 206 N.W. 69 (1925) ; Greene v. Agnew, 160
Wis. 224, 151 N.W. 268 (1915); Gordon v. State, 158 Wis. 32, 147 N.W. 998
(1914).
32 Poplowski v. State, 194 Wis. 385, 216 N.W. 488 (1927). Accord: Wille v.
State, 192 Wis. 224, 212 N.W. 260 (1927).
33 Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 266 (1913).
s4 Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N.W. 785 (1880).
35 Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 266 (1913).36 Blau v. U.S., 340 U.S. 159 (1950) ; Territory v. Lamier, 40 Hawaii 65 (1953).
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Section 891.39(2) provides that in an action in which the mother
to whom a child is born asserts that the husband is not the father,
such mother shall not be prosecuted upon evidence given in the pater-
nity suit.
PRESUMPTIONS
Under the present law designating paternity proceedings as civil
in nature, only two presumptions are of significance. They are the
presumption as to the time of conception3 7 and the presumption of
legitimacy.38 Prior to the Legislature's denomination of paternity ac-
tions as special civil proceedings in 1957. the defendant was entitled
to the presumption of innocence.
3 9
There is no presumption that sexual intercourse occurred because
there was mere opportunity.40 As a matter of fact, evidence of mere
opportunity for intercourse standing alone is not very convincing evi-
dence.4 ' Similarly, there is no presumption that the complainant has
told the truth.42
The presumption concerning the presumed time of conception is
discussed in following sections and will not be examined at this point.
The second presumption of primary importance in the trial of a pater-
nity case is the presumption of legitimacy. At early common law it
was conclusively presumed that the child of a married woman was
legitimate if born during lawful wedlock provided the husband was not
impotent and was within the "four seas." 43 Later the rule was revised
to provide that the presumption was not to be rebutted by evidence
which created only doubt and suspicion. It could be wholly removed
by a sufficient showing "that the husband was (1) incompetent; (2)
entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse or communication of any
kind with the mother; (3) entirely absent at the period during which
the child must, in the course of nature, have been begotten; or (4)
only present under such circumstances as afford clear and satisfactory
proof that there was no sexual intercourse.""4
It was also well settled that the husband and wife were incompetent
to testify as to non-access while they lived together. Testimony of the
wife tending to show non-access or any fact from which non-access
37 WIs. STAT. §891.395 (1965).
38 WIS. STAT. §891.39 (1965).
39Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952); Nelson v. State 210 Wis.
441, 245 N.W. 676 (1933) ; Gillis v. State, 206 Wis. 150, 238 N.W. 804 (1931) ;
Windahl v. State, 189 Wis. 424, 207 N.W. 694 (1926); Riley v. State, 187 Wis.
156, 203 N.W. 767 (1925) ; Roen v. State, 182 Wis. 515, 196 N.W. 825 (1924) ;
Emery v. State, 101 Wis. 627, 78 N.W. 145 (1899) ; Baker v. State, 47 Wis.
111, 2 N.W. 110 (1879).
40 State ex rel. Nussear v. Breeden, 41 Ind. App. 370, 83 N.E. 1020 (1908);
Walker v. State, 43 Ind. App. 605, 86 N.E. 502 (1908).
41 Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887) ; Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis.
235 (1872).
-2 State v. Halvorsen, 103 Minn. 265, 114 N.W. 957 (1908).
43 This meant within the jurisdiction of the king of England.
44 Shuman v. Shuman, 83 Wis. 250, 53 N.W. 455 (1892).
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could be inferred was scrupulously kept out.45 The rigorous limitation
placed upon those having the most intimate knowledge of the fact
of non-access increasingly fell subject to severe criticism.4" Conse-
quently, in 1923, the majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that evidence of non-access by the complainant could be received in
the absence of an objection on the part of the defendant. Nevertheless,
the right of the alleged father to "break the seal which the law has
placed upon the mother's lips by waiving her incompetency" was chal-
lenged by several members of the court.47
Where the impossibility of access at the time of conception by the
husband was established by ample evidence of witnesses other than the
complainant, the admission of a mother's testimony of intercourse with
the defendant was held not to be error.4
A high degree of proof was required to overcome the presumption
of legitimacy. It was referred to as "the most clear and conclusive
evidence," "strong degree of proof," or "the clearest evidence.149 The
unfortunate results which occurred in Romanowski v. Romanowski0
aroused the Legislature to change the rule.51 In that case testimony of
the mother and husband concerning access was not permitted. As a
result there was a finding that the child was born of the parties,
although the court found the evidence of separation sufficient to grant
the divorce. The trial court was of the opinion that the presumption did
not control the equities of the case and therefore declined to require
the husband to support the child. Two years later, upon motion, it
entered an order for support which on appeal was affirmed by a bare
majority of the supreme court.
Three members of the supreme court dissented arguing that the
presumption had been so effectively controverted by the trial court's
determination of the separation issue that the trial court's original
decision on support was the only equitable result. The minority was of
the opinion that the parties' evidence of non-access should not have
been rejected.
In the next session the Legislature adopted Chapter 38, Laws of
Wisconsin of 1945, which became section 328.39. Now it has been re-
numbered as section 891.39. It provides in part as follows:
5 State v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193 N.W. 651 (1923); Shuman v. Shuman, supra
note 44; Watts v. Owens, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N.W. 720 (1885); Mink v. State,
60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884).
46 111 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2063, 2064 (3rd ed. 1940) ; HOOPER, LAW OF ILLEGITI-
MACY 202, 217.
47 State v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193 N.W. 651 (1923).
48 Flynn v. State, 183 Wis. 348, 197 X.W. 716 (1924).
49 Watts v. Owens, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N.W. 720 (1885) ; Estate of Lewis, 207 Wis.
155, 240 N.W. 818 (1932) ; Riley v. State, 187 Wis. 156, 203 N.W. 767 (1925).
50 245 Wis. 199, 14 N.W.2d 23 (1944).
51 Vorvilas v. Vorvilas, 252 Wis. 333,31 N.W.2d 586 (1948).
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Whenever it is established in an action or proceeding that a
child was born to a woman while she was the lawful wife of a
specified man, any party asserting in such action or proceeding
that the husband was not the father of the child shall have the
burden of proving that assertion by a clear and satisfactory
preponderance of the evidence. In all such actions or proceedings
the husband and the wife are competent to testify as witnesses
to the facts. The court or judge shall in such cases order the
child made a party and shall appoint a guardian ad litem to ap-
pear for and represent the child whose paternity is questioned.
Three specific matters were covered. Both the husband and wife
were made competent to testify to the facts at issue; the burden to
overcome the presumption was increased to proof beyond all reason-
able doubt; the court was required to make the child a party and
appoint a guardian ad litem to appear for and to represent it.
In 1957 the Legislature created section 52.355 which incorporated
the burden of proof of section 328.39. Both sections were changed in
1959 to make the burden of proving the husband not to be the father
to consist of a clear and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence.
When proof of non-access is relied on to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy, it is not necessary to show that it was impossible for the
husband to be the father. In Zschock v. Industrial Commn 52 the Com-
mission's finding that the deceased was the father was set aside on
review, because there was no testimony that the husband was absent
from the mother at all material times. On appeal the supreme court
restored the finding that the presumption had been rebutted. Access
means more than the husband and wife being in each other's presence;
it means opportunity for intercourse which is not to be presumed.53
It is said that the presumption is "founded in decency, morality,
and policy,"54 but it has a factual basis grounded upon experience. In
Shuman v. Shuman55 the court quoted an early English case:
It is, however, very difficult to conclude against the legitimacy,
in cases where there is no disabiilty and where some society or
communication is continued between husband and wife during
the time in question, so as to have afforded opportunities of
sexual intercourse; ....
The force of this conclusion was put in focus sharply in Schmidt
v. Schmidt.56 In that matter the trial judge stated quite forcibly that
he could not believe that a husband and wife under no disability living
in the same household would abstain from sexual intercourse for pro-
tracted periods of time. The evidence which supported his judgment of
52 1 Wis.2d 231, 105 N.W.2d 374 (1960).
53 State v. Gouse, 134 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Child. Ct. 1954).
54 Lord Mansfield, Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowper 591 (1777); Mink v. State,
60 Wis. 583, 19 N.W. 445 (1884).
55 83 Wis. 250, 53 N.W. 455 (1892).
5621 Wis.2d 433, 124 N.W.2d 569 (1963).
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legitimacy included the fact that the birth and baptismal records were
in the name of the husband, that the parties lived in the same house
at the time the child was conceived, that the husband supported the
child in their home and did not openly disavow paternity until the
divorce trial, and that the wife's complaint alleged the child was born
as a result of the marriage.
Contradicting evidence was the testimony of both parties that the
date of last intercourse with one another would exclude the husband as
the father and the testimony of the wife of intercourse with another
who had agreed to pay $300 toward lying in expenses for the child
in question. The supreme court expressed difficulty in conceiving of
a possible motivation which would prompt both husband and wife to
unequivocally testify that the child was not a product of the marriage.
After carefully examining economic motives and all of the testimony
supporting the trial court's judgment, it concluded that a clear and
satisfactory preponderance of evidence rebutted the presumption. The
court relied upon the embittered relations and emotional tension
between the parties. Judgment was reversed.
The fact that a child was conceived prior to marriage does not
affect the application or operation of the presumption.5 7 In some states
a lesser degree of proof is required to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy in the case of an antenuptial conception.5 s The presumption
applies to the issue of marriages which are subsequently declared null
and void; and it makes no difference whether the litigation in which
the question is raised is civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal.5 9
Section 245.24 provides that if a child is born to parents
who have had a marriage solemnized according to law, but
one of whom has a prior marriage in force, the offspring are legitimate
if one entered the marriage in good faith and they continue to live as
husband and wife after the impediment of the former marriage is re-
moved by death or divorce of the former spouse.
There are no decisions in Wisconsin involving the situation in
which a child is conceived during the existence of the mother's marriage
to one man but born after her marriage to another and after the
first marriage was terminated. Generally, the courts have applied the
presumption to the second marriage, although there are cases to the
contrary.60 No presumption exists in the case of premarital birth,
although the Kentucky and an English court have indicated that such
57 Mader v. Mader, 258 Wis. 117, 44 N.W.2d 924 (1950) ; Vorvilas v. Vorvilas,
252 Wis. 333, 31 N.W.2d 586 (1948) ; Flynn v. State, 183 Wis. 348, 197 N.W.
716 (1924); State v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193 N.W. 651 (1923).
58 Richards v. State, 55 Ga. App. 184, 189 S.E. 682 (1937); McDermott v. Mc-
Dermott, 125 Neb. 179, 249 N.W. 555 (1933); Jackson v. Thornton, 133 Tenn.
36, 179 S.W. 384 (1915) ; Wilson v. Babb, 18 S.C. 59 (1882).
59 Watts v. Owens, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N.W. 720 (1885).6oArnot., 57 A.L.R.2d 729 (1958).
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facts should create at least a weak presumption that the husband is
the father. 61 Section 245.25 provides that when the father and mother
of a child born out-of-wedlock marry, such a child shall become legiti-
mated.
THE COMPLAINANT'S CASE
Proof of a Prima Facie Case
A prima facie case is established by proof of the birth out-of-
wedlock, date of birth, weight at birth, an accusation that the defendant
had sexual relations with the complainant during the conceptive period,
and the denial of the complainant that she had sexual relations with
any other man during the conceptive period. The complainant is per-
mitted to state who the father of her child is. Such is treated as a
statement of fact and not opinion.
62
The conceptive period in the case of a child whose weight at birth
is in excess of five and a half pounds is presumptively established by
statute.63 If the child is not a full term child, the conceptive period
must be established by other competent evidence. It is not essential
that the exact date of conception be proven.6 One act of intercourse
adequately identified as to time and place is sufficient to support a
judgment of paternity.65 The complainant's testimony, of course, need
not be corroborated.
6 6
Corroborating Circumstantial Evidence
After the complainant has proven a prima facie case, the trial
becomes a battle of corroborating circumstantial evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. Counsel for the complainant must seek to
introduce evidence which will corroborate her testimony of the act
by the defendant and of her credibility.
Intimacy and Opportunity
Mere opportunity for sexual intercourse between the parties is not
very convincing evidence standing alone because situations in which
there is opportunity embrace many innocent situations and relation-
ships.67 Nevertheless, such evidence is admissible as a first step to
show that the defendant is the father.6 8
61 Stevenson v. Washington's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 233, 21 S.W.2d 274 (1929); Stein's
Adm'r. v. Stein, 32 Ky. L.Rep. 604, 106 S.W. 860 (1908) ; Gardner v. Gardner,
L.R. 2 App. Cas. 723 H.L. (Eng. 1877).
62 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148 (1926).
63 WIS. STAT. §891.395 (1965).
64 State ex rel Isham v. Mullally, 15 Wis.2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701 (1961) ; Vogel
v. State, 220 Wis. 677, 265 N.W. 567 (1936) ; Stresney v. State ex rel. Bean,
186 Wis. 214, 202 N.W. 334 (1925) ; State ex reL. Dewey v. Kibbe, 186 Wis.
210, 202 N.W. 333 (1925); Menn v. State, 132 Wis. 61, 112 N.W. 38 (1907);
Humphrey v. State, 78 Wis. 569, 47 N.W. 836 (1891); Baker v. State, 69
Wis. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887).
65 State ex rel. Kurtz v. Knutson, 5 Wis.2d 609, 93 N.W.2d 348 (1958).
66 Roberts v. State, 84 Wis. 361, 54 N.W. 580 (1893).
67 See Douglas v. State, 134 Wis. 627, 114 N.W. 1121 (1908); Hofer v. State,
130 Wvkis. 576, 110 N.W. 391 (1907) ; Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235 (1862).
68 I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §132 (3rd ed. 1940).
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Proof of the sex act is an element of both adultery and paternity
cases; consequently, adultery cases provide some guidance for proof in
paternity casesY9 In a paternity case the fact of the birth of the child
establishes the act of intercourse, but the identity of the father remains
the elusive issue. Because the parties are rarely surprised in the act,
the fact must be proven by circumstantial evidence. In adultery cases
proof of adulterous inclination or disposition between the parties exist-
ing prior to the alleged act, combined with proof that the parties have
been together in equivocal circumstances such as would lead the
guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man under the circum-
stances to the conclusion of commission of the act by the defendant,
justifies the inference that the act took place at the time of the opportu-
nity. Although proof of inclination and opportunity suffice, inclination
means more than ordinary human tendencies and must extend to proof
suggesting specific libidinous tendency of each of the parties towards the
other and the opportunity must be understood as meaning more than
mere chance.70
In discussing the problem relative to adultery, the courts have indi-
cated that the circumstances which lead to the conclusion that adultery
has been committed cannot be laid down definitively in their entirety,
though many of them are of a more obvious nature and of more
frequent occurrence in life. It was said by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court that it was "impossible to indicate them universally because
they may be infinitely diversified by the situation and character of the
parties, by the state of general manners, and by many other incidental
circumstances, apparently slight and delicate in themselves, but which
may have most important bearings in decisions upon the particular
case." 7' Some of the more obvious circumstances of disposition to
commit the act are a showing of unwarrantable predilection for the
other person, clandestine correspondence, secret meetings, courtship,
promises of marriage or engagement, and passionate declarations. The
full gambit of circumstances of opportunity and disposition defy enum-
eration because they are not constant. Instead they are determinable
upon grounds of common reason and human experience.
As specifically applied to paternity cases, these principles resulted
in the approval of an instruction that the jury could consider evidence
of the complainant being with another man at suspicious times, but that
mere opportunity for intercouse is not very convincing as evidence.7 2
Evidence of visiting, socializing, and agreement to marry by the parties
69 See, Till v. State, 132 Wis. 242, 111 N.W. 1100 (1907) ; Monteith v. State, 114
Wis. 165, 89 N.W. 828 (1902); Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235 (1862).
70 Hofer v. State, 130 Wis. 576, 110 N.W. 391 (1907) ; Till v. State, supra note.
69.
7' Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235 (1862).72 Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887).
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although not within the conceptive period but at a time not remote has
held to be material.7
3
Residence in the home of the defendant by the complainant as a
housemaid and the taking of the complainant home late at night in
horse and buggy by defendant have been characterized as frequent and
favorable opportunities. Such evidence was held to be sufficient to
support a verdict without a showing of disposition for intimacy by
the parties where the court was strongly impressed with the credibility
of the complainant.74 Evidence of the presence of complainant and
defendant being frequently alone in defendant's apartment was not
persuasive, where it was the only circumstance corroborating com-
plainant's assertion that defendant was the father of her child. It has
been deemed sufficiently weak and unconvincing that, when coupled
with the questionable credibility of the complainant, a mistake in the
instruction, it was held to be error. Had the corroborating evidence
been stronger, the erroneous instruction would not have been prejudi-
cial.7 5 The testimony of a sister with whom the complainant lived that
she let the complainant and defendant into her house late at night and
left them alone in the living room which contained a davenport upon
which complainant slept was held sufficient to support a verdict of
paternity. Such finding was both corroborated and contradicted by
other evidence.7
6
Acts Outside Conceptive Period
Proof of an illicit relationship between the parties prior or subse-
quent to conception is admissible by the weight of authority. Rarely is
an objection made if the testimony of the act of intercourse relates to the
conceptive period as distinguished from a specific date upon which the
complainant claims to have become pregnant17 However, the majority
rule goes further and holds that evidence of acts occuring beyond the
conceptive period is admissible to show the intimacy and disposition
of the parties and as bearing upon the probability that intercourse took
place at the times alleged to have occurred within the conceptive
period.78 The only limit to the rule is that such acts must have been
73Ibid.
74 McClellan v. State, 66 Wis. 335, 28 N.W. 347 (1886).
75 Vogel v. State, 220 Wis. 677, 265 N.W. 567 (1936).
76 State ex rel. Jahn v. Rydell, 250 Wis. 377, 27 N.W.2d 486 (1946).
77 State v. Hammond, 46 Utah 249, 148 Pac. 420 (1915); People v. Schilling,
110 Mich. 412, 68 N.W. 233 (1896) ; People v. Keefer, 103 Mich. 83, 61 N.W.
338 (1894); State v. Smith, 47 Minn. 475, 50 N.W. 605 (1891); Baker v.
State, 69 Wis. 39 (1887).
78 Leach v. State, 398 P.2d 848 (Okla. 1965); Moses v. District of Columbia,
129 A.2d 412 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1957); State v. Stevens, 248 Minn. 309,
80 N.W.2d 22 (1956); State v. Becker, 231 Minn. 174, 42 N.W.2d 704 (1950);
Fuller v. United States, 65 A.2d 589 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1949); People v.
Leneschmidt, 260 Mich. 671, 245 N.W. 544 (1932); Siefker v. State, 128 Okla.
96, 261 Pac. 211 (1927); Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 180 Ky. 642, 203 S.W.
562 (1918) ; State v. Hammond, 46 Utah 249, 148 Pac. 420 (1915) ; Brantley
v. State, 11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914); State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447,
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sufficiently proximate in time and of sufficient significance in character
to afford an inference of intimacy and disposition of the parties at the
time of conception. The limits are fixed in the discretion of the judge. 9
Proof of prior relations does not create a presumption that de-
fendant committed the conceptive act but does corroborate evidence
of a repetition and makes the defendant more readily disbelievable. A
Connecticut court said such intercourse once begun is seldom discon-
tinued unless there is a want of the means and opportunity.80 There
is a direct causal relationship between the acts and they constitute a
link in the chain of circumstances. 8'
Evidence of illicit relations several months,8 2 one or two years,83
three years,84 and five years 85 has been received under circumstances
in which the court deemed them relevant.8 In the latter case the first
act was committed five years prior thereto, but continued through a
period which terminated shortly prior to pregnancy. Proximity of time,
continuity, frequency, and opportunity are important in determining
relevancy and each factor strengthens the probability. 7 What is a pro-
bative period of time in determining remoteness depends upon the
relationship of the parties, and each case must turn upon its own facts
to provide the basis of admissibility.8
Some courts restrict the evidence to acts prior to conception,89 but
others permit testimony of subsequent acts particularly where the out-
ward relationship of the parties and opportunities are the, same as
during the time of conception. Some courts require that there be an
135 Pac. 270 (1913); Commonwealth v. Blank, 79 Pa. Super. 49 (1911);
People v. Jamieson, 124 Mich. 164, 82 N.W. 835 (1900); Harty v. Malloy,
67 Conn. 339, 35 AtI. 259 (1896) ; Gemmill v. State, 16 Ind. App. 154, 43 N.E.
909 (1896); People v. Keefer, 103 Mich. 83, 61 N.W. 338 (1894); Ramey v.
State, 127 Ind. 243, 26 N.E. 818 (1891) ; Walker v. State, 92 Ind. 474 (1883) ;
Holcomb v. People, 79 Ill. 409 (1874); Beers v. Jackman, 103 Mass. 192
(1869); Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111 (1869); Thayer v. Davis, 38 Vt.
163 (1865); Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309 (1859); Commonwealth v.
Merriam, 14 Pick. 518 (Mass. 1833).79 Siefker v. State,supra note 78.80 Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309 (1859).
81 Commonwealth v. Blank, 79 Pa. Super. 49 (1911).
82 Brantley v. State, 11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914) ; Harty v. Malloy, 67
Conn. 339, 35 At]. 259 (1896); Ramey v. State, 127 Ind. 243, 26 N.E. 818
(1891).
83 State v. Becker, 231 Minn. 174, 42 N.W.2d 704 (1950) ; Siefker v. State, 128
Okla. 96, 261 Pac. 211 (1927) ; Walker v. State, 92 Ind. 474 (1883) ; Norfolk
v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309 (1859).
84 Thayer v. Davis, 38 Vt. 163 (1865).85 State v. Stevens, 248 Minn. 309, 80 N.W2d 22 (1956).
86 Ibid.
87 State v. Stevens, ibid; Brantley v. State, 11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914);
People v. Keefer, 103 Mich. 83, 61 N.W. 338 (1894); Ramey v. State, 127
Ind. 243, 26 N.E. 818 (1891).88 State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270 (1913); Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28
Conn. 309 (1859).89 State v. Hammond, 46 Utah 249, 148 Pac. 420 (1915).
9 People v. Jamieson, 124 Mich. 164, 82 N.W. 835 (1900); Gemmill v. State,
16 Ind. App. 154, 43 N.E. 909 (1896).
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instruction that evidence of remote acts is to be considered only for
the purpose of passing upon the credibility of the complainant and the
defendant.9' It must be made clear to the jury that a finding of paternity
can be made only upon an act of the defendant found to have occurred
in the conceptive period.9 2
This rule permitting such evidence is not to be confused with the
rule which precludes evidence of the complainant's reputation for
chastity, and it does not necessarily open the door to permit the de-
fendant to offer evidence of illicit relations by the complainant with
other men at times other than the conceptive period. Conceivably such
might occur where it can be shown that the complainant had a plural
and substantial relationship with two men as is frequently presented
in the case of multiple illegitimacies.
Defendant's Admissions and Acknowledgements
After supporting the complainant's direct testimony of intercourse
with the defendant in the conceptive period with evidence of oppor-
tunity and disposition to commit the act, the complainant's counsel
will seek to elicit evidence of statements or acts of the defendant which
are in the nature of admissions against his interest or which constitute
acknowledgement of his responsibility. Sometimes there are direct
verbal admissions of fatherhood made by the defendant to the com-
plainant or third parties. Other times the inference of culpability may
be weak and inconclusive. Whether a particular fact or circumstance
is too remote to be admitted may not be readily determinable. A fact
or circumstance in and of itself may seem trivial or wholly discon-
nected with the main fact. Yet when connected with other facts of
which there is substantial evidence, such trivial fact may aid the trier
materially in reaching a conclusion upon the issue of paternity. 93
Direct admissions to the complainant or to third parties may be
related by either. 4 Occasionally the admission takes the form of the
boastful declaration "that's my boy," 95 a doleful lament that "it was
the first time he had gone outside (the marital relationship) and he got
caught,"991 or by standing drinks "on his new-born baby. ' 97
9' State v. Stevens, 248 Minn. 309, 80 N.W.2d 22 (1956) ; State v. Becker, 231
Minn. 174,42 N.W.2d 704 (1950).92 People v. Leneschmidt, 260 Mich. 671, 245 N.W. 544 (1932); People v. Schill-
ing, 110 Mich. 412, 68 N.W. 233 (1896).
9' Nicholson v. State, 72 Ala. 176 (1882).
94 State v. Gouse, 134 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Child. Ct. 1954) ; Saratoga County Comm'n.
of Pub. Welfare v. A.B., 205 Misc. 1004, 131 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1954) ; State v.
Bowman, 231 N.C. 51, 55 S.E.2d 789 (1949); Ferrell v. State, 70 Ga. App.
651, 29 S.E.2d 185 (1944) ; Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043(1937) ; Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937) ; Kline v. State, 20
Ohio App. 191, 151 N.E. 802 (1925).
95 State v. Gouse, 134 N.Y.S2d 328 (Child. Ct. 1954).
96 Kline v. State, 20 Ohio App. 191, 151 N.E. 802 (1925).
97 State v. Bishop, 255 Wis. 416, 39 N.W.2d 399 (1949).
[Vol. 50
PATERNITY CASES
Frequently statements made by the defendant when he was con-
fronted by the complainant with the fact of her pregnancy are incrim-
inatory. Evidence of efforts by the defendant to induce the complainant
to take medication to precipitate a miscarriage or to have an abortion
is admissible, 98 although it may be weak or inconclusive.99 Offers of
marriage are probative of a recognition of responsibility for the com-
plainant's condition. 00 Promises of engagement,' 0 ' courtship, 0 2 or
letters of endearment or devotion' 0 3 are similarly corroborative of an
intimate relationship.
Such acts as visiting the complainant at the hospital during her
confinement,'" demonstrations of filial affection as sending greeting
cards identifying oneself as "Dad,"' 0 5 or visiting complainant's home
and holding the baby 08 are also indications of such a relationship and
tend to prove filiation. Voluntary assumption of the obligation of par-
enthood by the paying of the hospital and doctor bills for complainant's
confinement, and provision for nursing care or clothing are also indi-
cative of an acknowledgement of responsibility. 0 7 Proof of defendant's
signature upon an unauthenticated document constituting an official
admission of paternity in a foreign country,0 s and a paper in the de-
fendant's handwriting bearing a calculation of anticipated costs of
supporting the child have been admitted as admissions against the de-
fendant's interest. 0 9 The transfer by the defendant of his property
without consideration upon learning of the complainant's condition has
98 State v. Powers, 75 S.D. 209, 62 N.W.2d 764 (1954); State v. Tokstad, 139
Ore. 63, 8 P.2d 86 (1932); Swindle v. State, 21 Ala. App. 462, 109 So. 369(1926) ; Leister v. State, 136 Md. 518, 111 Atl. 78 (1920) ; Brantley v. State,
11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914).
99 Nicholson v. State, 72 Ala. 176 (1882).
100 Hughes v. State, 219 Wis. 9, 261 N.W. 670 (1935); State v. Stephon, 179
Minn. 80, 228 N.W. 335 (1929); Leister v. State, 136 Md. 518, 111 Atl. 78(1920) ; Jones v. State, 132 Md. 142, 103 AtI. 459 (1918) ; Johnson v. Dahle,
85 Neb. 450, 123 N.W. 437 (1909); Laney v. State, 109 Ala. 34, 19 So. 531
(1896).
101 Jones v. State, supra note 100; Brantley v. State, 11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So.
678 (1914) ; Gemmill v. State, 16 Ind. App. 154, 43 N.E. 909 (1896) ; Maisch
v. State, 128 Okla. 226, 262 Pac. 203 (1927).
102 Haddock v. State, 24 Ala. App. 402, 135 So. 649 (1931).
103 Jones v. State, 132 Md. 142, 103 Atl. 459 (1918); Ferrell v. State, 70 Ga.
App. 651, 29 S.E.2d 185 (1944) ; Graham v. State, 23 Ala. App. 331, 125 So.
200 (1929); State v. Powers, 75 S.D. 209, 62 N.W.2d 764 (1954); Gemmill
v. State, 16 Ind. App. 154, 43 N.E. 909 (1896) ; Walker v. State, 92 Ind. 474
(1893).
104 State v. Rydell, 250 Wis. 377, 27 N.W.2d 486 (1947).
105 Zschock v. Industrial Comm'n., 11 Wis2d 231, 105 N.W2d 374 (1960).
106 State v. Gouse, 134 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Child Ct. 1954); Arais v. Kalensnikoff,
10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937).
107 Zschock v. Industrial Comm'n., 11 Wis.2d 231, 105 N.W.2d 374 (1960) ; State
v. Gouse, supra note 106; Rossmiller v. Becker, 157 Neb. 756, 61 N.W.2d
393 (1953) ; State v. Bowman, 231 N.C. 51, 55 S.E.2d 789 (1949) ; Arais v.
Kalensnikoff, supra note 106; Leister v. State, 136 Md. 518, 111 Atl. 78(1920) ; Wille v. State, 192 Wis. 224, 212 N.W. 260 (1927).
108 Kamp v. Morang, 277 Ala. 575, 173 So.2d 566 (1964).
109 Jones v. State, 132 Md. 142, 103 Atl. 459 (1918).
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been held as an admission tending to show a consciousness of liabil-
ity.110
The unexplained flight of the defendant, when he is aware that
he is or may be suspected as the father, is indicative of a consciousness
of guilt. His departure is admissible and such facts as his ignorance
of the fact that he is charged or suspected, or of the birth itself are
circumstances which explain away the guilty significance of the conduct.
Hence the rule is stated that flight and all facts which increase or di-
minish the probative force of flight are admissible."'
Silence on the part of a person when the statement or assertion
of another is made in his presence under circumstances which would
naturally provoke a response or dissent if untrue may be tantamount to
an admission of the truth of the statement.1 1 2 Thus it has been held in
a paternity case that silence and refusal to talk when an innocent per-
son would ordinarily be vehement in his denial is conduct inconsistent
with one falsely accused of such a serious charge." 3 Of course, the
person against whom the admission is claimed must have heard and
understood the charge."1 4 In order to be culpatory the statement must
be made under circumstances in which the defendant was free to reply.
A good statement of the rule is made in Vail v. Strong,1" and is as
follows:
Evidence of this character may be permitted to go to the
jury, whenever the occasion, upon which the declaration is made
in the presence of the party, and the attendant circumstances,
call for serious admission or denial on his part; but the strength
of the evidence depends altogether upon the force of the cir-
cumstances and the motives, which must impel him to an explicit
denial, if the statement be untrue. But if no good reasons exist
to call for disclosure, and the party declines to enter into use-
less discussion, or answer idle curiosity, no legitimate inference
to his prejudice can be drawn from his silence.
Failure to disavow on the part of a husband, coupled with his sup-
port of the child, may not be conclusive because of equally strong
countervailing circumstances." 6
Of frequent application in paternity cases is the rule that evidence
of offers to settle or compromise a claim is not admissible as an ad-
mission of liability, but that admissions of independent or distinct.facts
110 State v. Anderson, 58 N.D. 721, 227 N.W. 220 (1929).
"' Haddock v. State, 24 Ala. App. 402, 135 So. 649 (1931) ; II WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE §276 (3rd ed. 1940).
112 II WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 111, §292. Accord: Mitler v. Associated Con-
tractors, 4 Wis.2d 568, 91 N.W.2d 367 (1958) ; Pawlowski v. Eskof ski, 209
Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932).11 Rossmiller v. Becker, 157 Neb. 756, 61 N.W.2d 393 (1953).
"14 Johnson v. State, 16 Ala. App. 4, 74 So. 972 (1917) ; J. H. Clark Co. v. Rice,
127 Wis. 451, 106 N.W. 231 (1906).
"5 10 Vt. 463 (1838).
116 Schmidt v. Schmidt, 21 Wis.2d 433, 124 N.W.2d 569 (1963).
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made during such negotiations may be offered. 117 The rule without
specific reference to paternity cases is fully discussed in State Medical
Society v. Associated Hosp. Service1 s and Connor v. Michigan Wiscon-
sin Pipe Line Co." 9 What is an admission of independent or distinct
fact or is part of an offer to compromise is often difficult to determine,
and the determination must stand on its own facts.1 2  The rule that
offers of settlement are admissible in criminal cases does not apply
because the proceedings are not criminal and the paternity laws en-
courage settlement.' 2 If a compromise is defaulted the compromise is
then admissible as an admission, as the policy basis for protecting
compromises no longer exists. 22
Declarations of the Complainant
The declarations of the complainant to third parties not in the
presence of the defendant are inadmissible as self-serving statements. 2 1
By statute such evidence is admissible in Connecticut to corroborate
the complainant's testimony.12 4 Some other states also permit such
testimony if made by the complainant in the time of her travail on
the theory that the painful circumstances of the occasion give some
trustworthiness to the declaration."25 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
and others have rejected such testimony."26 Proof of such out-of-court
declarations may be made to rebut testimony of the defendant that the
complainant never accused the defendant to anyone."2 7
17 Commonwealth v. Luciano, 205 Pa. Super. 397, 208 A.2d 881 (1965); Sim-
mons v. State, 98 Ga. App. 159, 105 S.E2d 356 (1958); State v. Stevens, 248
Minn. 309, 80 N.W.2d 22 (1956) ; Pitts v. United States, 95 A.2d 588 (Munic.
Ct App. D.C. 1953); Harrison v District of Columbia, 95 A.2d 332 (Munic.
Ct. App. D.C. 1953) ; People v. Haab, 260 Mich. 673, 245 N.W. 545 (1932) ;
Looney v. State, 25 Ala. App. 23, 140 So. 181 (1932); People v. Gill, 247
Mich. 479, 226 N.W. 214 (1929) ; Kline v. State, 20 Ohio App. 191, 151 N.E.
802 (1925) ; Robb v. Hewitt, 39 Neb. 217, 58 N.W. 88 (1894) ; Olson v. Peter-
son, 33 Neb. 358, 50 N.W. 155 (1891) ; Miene v. Olsen, 37 Ill. App. 589 (1890);
Martin v. State, 62 Ala. 119 (1878).
118 23 Wis.2d 482, 128 N.W.2d 43 (1964).
119 15 Wis.2d 614, 113 N.W2d 121 (1962).
120 State Medical Society v. Associated Hosp. Service, 23 Wis.2d 482, 128 N.W.2d
43 (1964); Kline v. State, 20 Ohio App. 191, 151 N.E. 802 (1925).
121 Commonwealth v. Luciano, 205 Pa. Super. 397, 208 A.2d 881 (1965).
22 Pitts v. United States, 95 A.2d 588 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1953).
12Lockman v. Fulton, 162 Neb. 439, 76 N.W2d 452 (1956); Armstrong v.
Watrous, 138 Conn. 127, 82 A.2d 800 (1951); Moen v. Fry, 215 Iowa 344,
245 N.W. 297 (1932) ; People v. Haab, 260 Mich. 673, 245 N.W. 545 (1932) ;
Akeson v. Doidge, 225 Mass. 574, 114 N.E. 726 (1917) ; State v. Spencer, 73
Minn. 101, 75 N.W. 893 (1898); Richmond v. State, 19 Wis. 307 (1865).
124 Armstrong v. Watrous, supra note 123.
12 Commonwealth v. Losey, 79 Pa. Super. 75 (1922) ; King v. State, 121 Miss.
230, 83 So. 164 (1919); Hellman v. Karp, 93 Conn. 317, 105 Atl. 678 (1919);
Ham v. West, 117 Miss. 340, 78 So. 291 (1918); Burns v. Donoghue, 185
Mass. 71, 69 N.E. 1060 (1904) ; Bowers v. Wood, 143 Mass. 182, 9 N.E. 534
(1887) ; Commonwealth v. McLain, 8 Pa. D. & C. 765 (1860).
128 State v. Watzek, 158 Minn. 351, 197 N.W. 669 (1924) ; Richmond v. State,
19 Wis. 307 (1865) ; State v. Hussey, 7 Iowa 409 (1858).
"27 People v. Cole, 113 Mich. 83, 71 N.W. 455 (1897).
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Birth Certificates
Section 69.30 provides that the physician or midwife in attendance
upon any birth shall file a certificate of birth, completely filled out,
giving all particulars required by the statutes. The official form supplied
by the Wisconsin State Board of Health inquires as to the name of the
father.1 28 Section 69.29 (1) requires that if the complainant is married
the certificate must list the name of the husband as the father unless
and until there has been a judicial determination to the contrary. Such
a certificate is inadmissible in evidence in a proceeding to determine
paternity.
Despite the fact that the information of the doctor completing the
certificate is the self-serving declaration of the mother, such hearsay
evidence is admissible in the case involving the unmarried mother.
Section 891.09(1) makes the birth certificate presumptive evidence
of the birth. Church, baptismal, and doctor records are also
presumptive evidence of the facts contained therein relating to any
birth including the names of persons, dates, and other material facts.
Although the issue has not been determined directly in a paternity case,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the information contained
in the records covered by section 891.09 is admissible as prima facie
evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character. It is rebuttable. 1 9
This determination has been made in two cases involving a minor
child's claim for support as a dependent under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law. Birth certificates were received in evidence in those
cases as affirmative proof establishing paternity.
130
In the Zschock case"1x the court simply observed that the birth rec-
ords are presumptive evidence. It also made reference to section
327.18 (1) which provides that official certificates and records made
by any public officer are evidence of the facts stated therein, thus im-
plying that birth records were official records although they are made
by the attending physician engaged in private practice. It follows from
these decisions that the court has considered the naming of the father
as an item of fact as distinguished from conclusions, which are not
admissible even though they are contained in official records. 1
32
In Schmidt v. Schmidt,1. 3 a birth certificate showing the husband to
be the father was received as proof of the husband's fatherhood. The
128 WIs STAT. §69.30(2) (1965) adds that if there is no attending physician or
midwife, then the father, householder or owner of the premises, manager or
superintendent of a public or private institution in which the birth occurred
shall file the certificate.
129In re Estate of Eannelli, 269 Wis. 192, 68 N.W.2d 791 (1955).
130Zschock v. Industrial Comm'n., 11 Wis.2d 231, 105 N.W.2d 374 (1960);
Waunakee Canning Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 268 Wis. 518, 68 N.W.2d 25
(1955).
131 Zschock v. Industrial Comm'n., supra note 130.
132 In re Estate of Eannelli, 269 Wis. 192, 68 N.W.2d 791 (1955).
'3321 Wis.2d 433, 124 N.W.2d 569 (1963).
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probative weight of the birth certificate as evidence of paternity should
be considered in juxtaposition with the court's ruling in the early
Richmond case.'34 It will be recalled that it was said there that the
mother's declaration as to the child's paternity made to the attending
physician was inadmissible even though made during her travail. Query
as to how much the trustworthiness of such a statement is improved
by the fact that the physician has now put the mother's statement in
writing.
There are relatively few cases which discuss the admissibility of
birth records to establish paternity. Some jurisdictions receive the birth
records as-affirmative proof of the fact and others do not.
Over an objection that the birth certificate constituted hearsay and
recited information obtained by the attending doctor from the com-
plainant, Georgia has approved the receipt of birth certificates in evi-
dence to establish paternity. The court observed that the portion of
the certificate which related to the date of birth, sex of the child, and
certain facts concerning the name, race, place of residence, and other
facts concerning its mother were not obtained by the physician through
hearsay and were clearly admissible. Hence, it dubiously reasoned,
"most, if not all, of this evidence was admissible, and the (trial) court
did not err in allowing it (the certificate) to go to the jury over the
objection .... "'l5 Moreover, as further justification, the court observed
that the legislative act requiring the preparation of the birth certificate
contemplated that the physician "by diligent enquiry" obtain some of
the information which the certificate must contain.
The courts of Connecticut also permit certificates to be admitted as
corroborative proof in behalf of the complainant, because the law re-
quires the physicians to file them. Consequently, it was thought it had
trustworthiness because it is less likely that a complainant would make
a false accusation to "a representative of the law."' 3 6
It would also appear that the New York courts permit the intro-
duction of such evidence for purposes other than impeachment. In
Coler v. McTighe"I 7 it was held that the presumption of legitimacy was
strengthened by a baptismal certificate which showed the husband as
the father, although such information was obtained from the complain-
ant. In another New York case it was held that an entry upon a birth
certificate was outweighed by an entry upon a baptismal record, be-
cause the latter was made as part of a religious ceremony when the
parents were present. 3
8
The District of Columbia court has rejected the introduction of
'14 Richmond v. State, 19 Wis. 307 (1865).
135 Posey v. State, 46 Ga. App. 290, 167 S.E. 340 (1932).
138 Hellman v. Karp, 93 Conn. 317, 105 Atl. 678 (1919).
'37 213 App. Div. 831, 209 N.Y.S. 201 (1925).
138 State v. Gouse, 134 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Child. Ct. 1954).
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such evidence to establish paternity as hearsay, but admits it to estab-
lish the facts and date of birth."39
There, of course, is unanimity that such records can be used to
impeach the testimony of the complainant when such record differs
from the complainant's testimony given in evidence-except where the
law, as in Wisconsin, requires that the name of the husband be inserted
in the case of a married woman until a legal determination to the con-
trary is made.
140
THE DEFENDANT'S CASE
The tools of the lawyer's craft in this area for defense counsel are
extremely limited. Persuasion of the trier by proof of corroborative cir-
cumstantial evidence or of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony is
at best a tricky business. The art of cross-examination *and whatever
other techniques the lawyer's ingenuity and circumstances permit fre-
quently are not sufficient. The trier, whether jury or judge, tends to
rely upon his experience in the affairs of life to determine what is or is
not plausible. Sometimes the reasons upon which the axiom "truth is
stranger than fiction" is founded are present, and the truth flies in the
face of reason. Sympathy for the mother and her child may intervene.
Attempts by the parties to clean up their story to make it more socially
acceptable may mislead or confuse the trier as to where fiction ends and
truth begins. A six year study conducted with the use of the lie detector
in Chicago caused John E. Reid & Associates to conclude that 93%
of the parties in paternity actions tested subsequent to trial lied in court
in some respect concerning their testimony in reference to the sexual
relations.1 4
1
Before taking his chances with the vagaries of a determination
resting solely upon the credibility of the parties and circumstantial
evidence, the experienced lawyer will explore the possibility of how
medical science may help his client. Medical science provides several
touchstones or guideposts in almost all cases and in some cases may
provide conclusive or determinative proof.
The first logical question to be asked is whether the defendant was
physically able to procreate at the time of the complainant's conception.
Next, blood tests offer a high degree of possible exclusion of the
defendant, if in fact he is not the father. It is believed that by the
combined use of the three basic blood groups, false paternity charges
can be eliminated in at least fifty-one per cent of the cases, and it is
9 Lee v. District of Columbia, 117 A.2d 922 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1955).
140 Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 Pa. Super. 522, 111 A.2d 151 (1955); Harrison
v. District of Columbia, 95 A.2d 332 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1953); Lawhead
v. State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 Pac. 376 (1924).
14' Arthur & Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth
in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology
and Police Science 213 (1945).
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hoped that the efficiency of more comprehensive testing and analysis
will be raised to seventy or eighty per cent.
Because of the physiology and mechanics of impregnation, proof
of intercourse by more than one man within the conceptive period pre-
cludes a finding that anyone is the father, unless all but one are excluded
for some other conclusive reason.
M ,edical science is of help in establishing the time of conception. The
time of conception is important because it fixes the date or time of the
procreant act and thus may lead to one or more of the defenses with
which the defendant can challenge the complainant's story. Heredity,
over and above its operation in blood testing, may provide convincing
proof in the form of racial factors or unusual physical characteristics.
Finally, in some jurisdictions and under some circumstances, truth de-
ception tests might be available to the parties.
Impotency and Sterility
As indicated above the first thing which might occur to the defense
attorney is whether the defendant was capable of procreating at the
time the child was conceived. This would be particularly true if the
defendant were quite young or quite old. Proof establishing impotency
or sterility is the most certain and the clearest proof of non-paternity. 14 2
Normally, the male becomes fertile at the age of fourteen to sixteen
and may remain fertile until seventy or eighty years; however, a boy
may be fertile at nine years of age.' It is said that a man becomes old
when he feels old and only becomes impotent when he gives up his
potency.144 Actually, age is an important factor in the reproductive
potential, but is more significant in relationship to the ease of concep-
tion rather than the possibility. It is true, of course, that the chances
of procreation diminish after the male reaches 50 years, but such
chances may be improved by a more fertile partner.24 5
Impotency is defined as the inability to complete the sexual act.
It is either functional, and of a psychological origin, or organic. Because
male potency is highly susceptible to psychosomatic impulses, a male
might be impotent with one woman and not with another. Hence, it is
difficult to rule out paternity because of functional impotency. Organic
impotency results from a physical deformity or disease making coitus
impossible. It is estimated that 90 per cent of impotency is functional,
and ten per cent is organic. 46
1421 JONES' COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE 129 (2d ed. 1926).
143GONZALES, VANCE, HELPERN & UMBERGER, LEGAL MEDICINE, PATHOLOGY &
TOXICOLOGY 617 (2d ed. 1954) ; WKERSHUB, SEXUAL IMPOTENCE IN THE MfALE 95(1959).
'44WERSHUB, op. cit. supra note 143, at 97.
145 WERSHUB, Op. cit. supra note 143, at 95; BuxToN & SOUTHIHAM, HUMAN
FERTILITY 13 (1958); WHITE AND GREEN-ARMYTAGE, THE MANAGEMENT OF
IMPAIRED STERILITY 290 (1962); ISRAEL, M\fENSTRUAL DISoRDERS & STERILITY
533 (4th ed. 1959).
146 WERSHUB, op. cit. supra note 143, at 36, 97-100.
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Sterility and infertility, which are synonymous, denote the inability
to procreate because of the absence of normal spermatozoa, presence of
faulty spermatozoa, or the inability to transmit the spermatozoa. Var-
ious infections such as syphilis, tuberculosis, gonorrhea, and probably
mumps might affect fertility.
The degree of male fertility is determined clinically by the volume
of semen and the concentration, morphology, motility, and viability
of the spermatozoa. Generally it is agreed that the quantity of normal
ejaculate is in the area of 3.55 cubic centimeters containing a total of
about 80 million spermatozoa per cubic centimeter. One cannot assume
that the semen must meet a stated minimum standard, because pro-
creation is dependent upon the respective fertility of both the male
and female. Thus sub-standard semen may cause conception.
147 Most
authorities consider a minimum of a total concentration of 60 million
spermatozoa per cubic centimeter or 20 million active spermatozoa per
cubic centimeter as the fertile level for conception given an average
partner21 8
Farris prescribes testing at five day intervals and sets minimum
standards to include a volume 2.5 cubic centimeters of ejaculate with
80 per cent of the spermatozoa being of normal shape and at least 38
per cent being motile. These standards would provide 20 million active
spermatozoa per cubic centimeter. He also finds pregnancy occurring
in three per cent of those situations when the semen failed to meet these
standards.14 9
It must be realized however that, from the medical viewpoint,
pregnancy can result from a concentration as low as one million per
cubic centimeter,'150 and that fertilization of the ova is by only one
spermatozoa. Buxton and Southham state that it is impossible to clas-
sify a man as infertile unless azoospermia is found on repeated exam-
inations.1
51
Sterility can be accomplished surgically by what is termed a vasec-
tomy which simply blocks the exit of the sperm. Post-operative tests
must be conducted because spermatozoa may continue in the semen
following the vasectomy. Sperm are stored in the seminal vessels, and
clearance may take two to eight weeks. Until then impregnation may
occur. In rare instances the presence of an accessory vas deferens or
spontaneous recanalization can occur; hence, spermatozoa might again
be found in the semen.'
52
14"ISRAEL, op. cit. supra note 145, at 533.
148 McLoD, THE SEMEN SPECIMEN, CONFERENCE IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF STERILITY
(1946); ISRAEL, op. cit. supra note 145, at 541; WHITE AND GREEN-ARMYTAGE,
op. cit. supra note 145, at 290.
14 9 FARRIS, HUMAN FERTILITY-THE MALE 87 (1950).
150 ISRAEL, Op. cit. supra note 145, at 541.
151 BUXTON & SOUTHHAM, op. cit. supra note 145, at 57.
152 Kaufman, Vasectomy: Medical and Legal Spects., TRAUMA No. 1, 110 (1960).
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The courts generally have given evidence of impotency or sterility
probative weight equal to its medical certainty as determined by the
particular facts. Proof of impotency or sterility of course must be
established as of the conceptive period.15 3 Testimony of a medical expert
establishing a prior successful vasectomy negates a conclusive presump-
tion of legitimacy,"' even when the burden of proof to overcome the
presumption requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.155 In other
cases medical opinion of impotency or sterility based upon organic
defects coupled with seminal tests demonstrating no live sperm or sperm
of doubtful quality has been characterized as strong or substantial evi-
dence.2-'
Proof of sterility based upon examination of seminal fluid to deter-
mine presence or absence of motile spermatozoa alone and without
substantial corroborating evidence of organic defect is less persuasive.
In Houston v. Houston5 7 a New York court observed that, unlike the
techniques used in blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity, the
tests of seminal fluids have not been developed to a point of scientific
certainty. Quoting Hotchkiss 58 the court stated:
More errors are made as a result of faulty collection of the
semen than in any other single step in the examination of the
husband. The ideal system would permit a sample of the ejacu-
late to be produced in contact only with the substances found
in vivo and to be preserved under the same conditions of gas
tension found in human genital passages.1 9
Because it doubted the quality of the laboratory examinations of
the purported specimens of the defendant's seminal fluid and consid-
ered the total medical evidence inconclusive to prove sterility at the
conception time and because there was a dearth of evidence of a para-
mour or inclination of infidelity on the part of the wife, the court
refused to hold that the presumption had been overcome. Although the
court's evaluation of the medical proof might be open to debate, the
case demonstrates that care and thoroughness are required to establish
the defense of sterility. Similarly, a medical opinion that a semen
specimen represented a very poor specimen for successful insemination
and satisfactory fertility purposes so that the consensus of medical
opinion would be that such was not adequate to impregnate was held to
'1' Houston v. Houston, 199 Misc. 469, 99 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1950); Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 191 Misc. 236, 77 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1948).
154Hughes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App.2d 781, 271 P.2d 172 (1954); Note, 28 So.
CAL. L. REv. 185 (1955).
'55 In re Kessler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956).
256 Lyons v. Scott, 181 Cal. App.2d 787, 5 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1960); Hogeboom v.
Hurlburt, 207 Misc. 992, 141 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1955) ; Potasz v. Potasz, 68 Cal.
App.2d 20, 155 P.2d 895 (1945).
157 199 Misc. 469, 99 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1950).
158 HoCrcH Iss, FERTILITY IN MEN 102 (1952).
'5 Houston v. Houston, 199 Misc. 469, 99 N.Y.S.2d 199, 205 (1950).
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be important evidence, but not sufficient to overcome overwhelming
evidence favorable to the complainant. 80
Applying the rule that a trial court will not be reversed if there is
substantial evidence to support its finding, the California Supreme
Court held that proof of prior injury and sterility which might not
have existed at the time of conception was insufficient to upset the
finding of paternity.'8"
Uncontradicted medical proof of sterility following a successful
vasectomy has been held not to be conclusively binding upon the trier
in determining a motion for summary judgement, when there is lay
testimony to the contrary. This was held to be true even though the lay
testimony consisted only of sexual relations between the parties, and
there was the child to prove it.162
The latter two cases are more of procedural significance rather
than of determining the weight of such proof. When the issue is close,
it has been held to be error to fail to grant an adjournment to permit
counsel to prove sterility. 163 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has dealt
with sterility as a defense in a paternity case on only one occasion. It
was then held error for the trial court to take judicial notice that ster-
ility resulting from mumps is intermittent, when there is medical
opinion that the defendant was sterile during the conceptive period
based upon findings of a current azoospermia and history of infection
resulting from mumps.14
Use of Blood Tests
Alexander S. Wiener, one of the foremost American experts in the
field of blood testing, has observed that the difficulty of establishing pa-
ternity has been recognized from the earliest Biblical times. He wrote
that according to the Talmud no man may swear that he is the father
of a child; only the woman may swear that she is the mother.1
65
Another has said that maternity is a matter of fact, paternity is a mat-
ter of opinion. 16
Thus, importance of blood tests in disputed paternity cases is drama-
tized by the fact that the possibility of excluding one who is in fact not
the father is estimated to be at least 50 per cent when three basic blood
group systems are employed.16 The chances of proving non-paternity
vary with the blood group of the individual and to some extent with
16o De Angelis v. Guiseppe, 276 App. Div. 1102, 97 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1949).
161 Krog v. Krog, 32 Cal.2d 812, 198 P.2d 510 (1948).
1'2 Crepaldi v. Wagner, 132 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1961).
163 Dept. of Pub. Welfare, City of New York v. Hamilton, 282 App. Div. 1025,
126 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1953).
164 Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952).
165 Wiener, Parentage and Blood Groups, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, July 1954.
166 GRADWOHL, LEGAL MEDICINE 565 (1954).
167 GRADWOHL op cit supra note 166, at 546; Sussman, Blood Grouping and Dis-
puted Paternity, 40 AMERICAN J. OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 38 (1963) ; REGAN
AND MORITz, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE 182 (1956) ; Cortese v. Cortese, 10
N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
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the group distribution within the population.168 New discoveries, of
which the medical literature abounds almost monthly, raise the theo-
retical estimate to a present peak of seventy to eighty per cent or even
higher, if the rare anti-sera and the latest achievements with inheritable
serum are used.169 No matter how many different blood tests are dis-
covered, there will always be the chance that a man will have the in-
criminating blood type whether he is the father or not.1 0
European courts utilized the results of blood tests as early as 1924,
but the first reported case in United States appeared in 1931.71 Wis-
consin was the second state to adopt legislation making proof of the
results of blood test evidence in disputed paternity cases. The statute
was first passed in 1935, and its 1939 amendments were drafted by
Professor Wigmore. It was described as a model for future legislation,
because it was comprehensive and embraced all of those features
thought to be desirable.1 72
In 1952 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws approved the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Pater-
nity. 173 The Wisconsin statute governing blood tests and the uniform
act are generally alike except in two instances. The former has broader
provisions concerning the submission to these tests of those persons
subject to the court's order. However, the Wisconsin statute does not
permit admission of the results of a test to prove paternity, as does
the uniform act under certain conditions.
It is not the purpose of the writer to attempt a detailed analysis or
description of blood grouping tests, but a rudimentary understanding
of the basic principles underlying serological blood tests is necessary to
intelligently try a paternity action. Comprehensive discussions of the
mechanics and principles employed can be found in a great number of
legal and medical writings.:7 4
In 1900 Karl Landsteiner, a famous pathologist, published the
168 GOu1ZALES, VANCE, HELPERN & UMBERGER, LEGAL MEDICINE, PATHOLOGY &
ToxcoLoGY 639 (2d ed. 1954); Schapiro, Serology & Genetics of a "New"
Blood Factor Hr, 11 JOURNAL OF FoR NSIC MEDICINE 52 (1964).
16 Henningsen, Some Aspects of Blood Grouping in Cases of Disputed Paternity
in Denmark, 2 M-rHODS OF FONICSC SCIENCE 209-210 (1963) ; see 82 SCIENCE
NEws LETER 256 (1962) ; BOYD, FUNDAMENTALS OF IMMUNOLOGY 230 (3rd ed.
1957); REGAN AND MORITZ, op. cit. supra note 167, at 182.
170 Wiener, supra note 165.
171 Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931) ; Maguire, A Survey
of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the American Law of Evidence,
16 So. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1943).
172 SCHATHIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 229 (3rd ed.).
173 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 102, adopted by six states as of 1964.
'
7 4 ANRESON, THE HUMAN BLOOD GROUPS (1952) ; GONZALES, VANCE, HELPERN
& UMBERGER, Op. cit. supra note 168; Wiener, supra note 165; Comment,
Evidence-The Use of Blood Tests in Disputed Parentage Cases, 50 MicH. L.
Rxv. 582 (1952) ; Comment, From Here to Paternity; Blood Grouping Tests
in Bastardy and Divorce Proceedings, 3 S.D. L. REv. 125 (1958); Note,
Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Grouping Tests in Paternity Suits, 21 U. PITT.
L. REv. 85 (1959).
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results of investigations concerning the clumping of blood upon trans-
fusions. He found that when the serum and blood cells of certain peo-
ple were mixed specific reactions occurred between the red cells and
specific substances in the sera. These reactions were demonstrated to
result from normal properties of blood. The most important of these
is iso-agglutination in which the serum of one group agglutinates the
red blood cells of another.
In the blood cells there are substances called agglutinogens of which
there are different types. The presence of the types of agglutinogens is
dependent upon laws of heredity. If a type of agglutinogen is not pres-
ent, there will be present an anti-substance in the serum which is known
as an agglutinin. It is this anti-substance which causes blood cells of
another type to clump. This process can be seen by the naked eye. By
testing bloods with sera containing different agglutinins, the type of
blood can be determined. The sera is verified by using known blood
types.
Landsteiner found that there were two major types of agglutinins
which he designated anti-A and anti-B. This led to the discovery of a
system of blood grouping called the A B 0 method in which there were
four blood types, 0, A, B, and AB. For his work Landsteiner received
the Nobel prize in 1930. Soon thereafter another independent system,
the MN system, was discovered which was then followed by the Rh
-Hr system. By 1955 ten different major blood groups were found to-
gether with new factors refining the tests. In addition, there are many
other groups of occurrence, some of which are limited to individual
families. 7 5 In 1952 the Medicolegal Committee of the American Medical
Association approved the use of the ABO, MN, and the Rh-Hr sys-
tems. 17 6 However, the courts have given results based on other systems
evidentiary weightY.7 7
The type of agglutinogen and other properties present in blood is
governed by heredity. All hereditary characteristics are governed by the
presence of at least one pair of factors called genes which are present
in the nuclei of the cells of each individual. In the process of reproduc-
tion, one gene of each pair is derived from the maternal organism and
the other from the paternal organism. If the two genes governing a
character are alike in the maternal and paternal organism, the char-
acters concerned are transmitted unchanged to the child. The two
genes might be unlike and in such case a new combination will arise in
the child. Hence, when the blood groups of the father and mother are
known, it is possible to predict the types the child might have within
the various groups. Conversely, when the blood group of a child is in-
compatible with that of the alleged father, according to the rules of
15 Sussman, Human Blood Groupings, 2 TRAUMA No. 6, 50, 54 (1960).
176 149 A.M.A.J. 699 (1952).
1 Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N. Hamp. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954).
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heredity, non-paternity is established. Another way of putting it is that
within each system certain constellations cannot occur among a mother,
child, and the biological father. If such occurs the alleged father can-
not be the natural father. 78
For example, assume the mother to be of type N, the child of type
MN, and the alleged father N. The man cannot be the father because
agglutinogen M is lacking in both the mother and alleged father. It
is the possible multiple combinations produced by the various types
within each group which produces the definitive character of the tests.
Wiener estimates that at least 288 different combinations are possible
when the three basic systems are used.17 9
The evidentiary conclusiveness given an exclusionary result rests
upon several biological characteristics of the blood as well as fixed
hereditary principles. Blood grouping is demonstrable with comparative
ease and extreme accuracy. One's blood grouping remains constant
throughout one's life. Rare genetic phenomenon can occur and thus do
not permit absolute certainty, but the tests are believed to be 99.99 per
cent or more accurate. 80
Although the reactions are easily observed, and the principles upon
which the tests are founded are reliable, there are significant sources of
error in conducting the tests.'8 ' These errors can be either administra-
tive or technical. The source of administrative errors can be reduced by
the adoption of standards and techniques assuring identity of blood
tested as being that of the parties involved. This can be insured by re-
quiring the parties to appear together at the laboratory. Proper identi-
fication and labeling of specimens; maintenance of quality controls of
the blood specimens, serums, and reagents; cross checking of results
and the conducting of independent duplicate tests are also necessary
procedures. An examiner fully versed in serological methods and
problems assures the installation of effective standards and adherence
to those standards.
Skills are necessary to discern the possible effects of disease, tem-
peratures, existence of rare blood groups, phenomena such as rouleaux
formation, weak testing serums, atypical or irregular agglutination oc-
curring in about three per cent of human sera, the bacteriogenic ag-
glutination resulting from stale specimens, and the remote possibility
of a mutation as an exception to the genetic laws.
178 HE NINGSEN, supra note 169, at 209.
179 REGAN & MORITZ, op. cit. supra note 167, at 182.
180 HENNINGSEN, supra note 169, at p. 209; see supporting authorities cited in
Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 466 (1958).Is' ANDRESON, Op. cit. supra note 174; Littell and Sturgeon, Defects in Discovery
and Testing Procedures: Two Problems in Medicolegal Application of Blood
Grouping Tests, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 629 (1958) ; Ross, supra note 180, at 466;
SCHATKIN, op. cit. supra note 172, at 203; GONZALES, VANCE, HELPERN &
UMBERGER, op. cit. supra note 168, at 638; HENNINGSEN, supra note 169, at 209.
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The reliability of medicolegal conclusions of blood tests is statu-
torily protected by the insistence upon examiners who are specialists in
clinical pathology and the provision for their cross-examination. Be-
cause the determinations are schematic and independent of the other
aspects of the parties' testimony, it is the general practice in Milwaukee
County to accept a letter from the examiner certifying the results as
evidence of the results. This is merely a rule of convenience which is
practiced without objection by counsel.
Because the blood of a newborn child may not be fully developed,
blood tests are usually postponed until the child is at least one month
old. (Where the issue of paternity of an unborn child is raised in a di-
vorce action, once the party raising such issue desires to have blood tests
made, the trial court may adjourn the action on its own motion. 182 ) The
tests may be taken only by a duly qualifiied physician who hat special-
ized in the field of clinical pathology or who holds a certificate from
the American Board of Pathology. If an exclusion is established by the
first test, a second test may be ordered by an independent physician
similarly qualified.
The Wisconsin statute permits any party to request tests of the
child, mother, defendant, and any male witness who has testified and
who is directly involved in the controversy if such is relevant. When-
ever there is evidence that the defendant or another male or males had
sexual intercourse with the complainant during the conceptive period,
the tests become relevant because of the possibility of excluding the
defendant or the other males.183 However, the phraseology of the
statute limits tests of males other than the defendant to those who have
testified and are involved in the controversy. This reaches those who
come forward and admit having sexual relations with the complainant
during the conceptive period, but not those whose names are suggested
as paramours. If neither the defendant nor the other admitting male is
excluded, and the trier is satisfied that both had intercourse with the
complainant during the conceptive period, neither can be found to be
the father.18 4 However, if the other males are excluded, the defendant
remains in the controversy.
In a relatively recent case, three men other than the defendant
came forward and admitted having sexual relations with the complain-
ant during the conceptive period. Although the defendant had admitted
having sexual relations with the complainant during the conceptive
period, and all three of the other male witnesses were excluded by
the blood test, the defendant was nevertheless found not to be the
82 Limberg v. Limberg, 10 Wis2d 63, 102 N.W.2d 103 (1960).
183 Anthony v. Anthony, 9 N.J. Super. 411, 74 A.2d 919 (1950).
184Johnson v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.W. 674 (1907) ; Busse v. State, 129
Wis. 171, 108 N.W. 64 (1906); Baker v. State, 47 Wis. 111, 2 N.W. 110
(1879).
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father because of the court's belief of promiscuity on the part of the
complainant with still others during the conceptive period. 8 5
In Milwaukee County the defendant is fully advised by the court or
the corporation counsel of his right to a blood test, but he is told that
the responsibility of arranging the test is upon him. He is also told that
the court's clerk will arrange the first test at a specified clinic if he
desires to use such facilities. This is done merely as an administrative
convenience to expedite the testing and reporting. The defendant is
warned that failure to appear at the appointed time may constitute a
waiver of his right, and others are warned that they may be punished
for contempt for failure to appear.
The right is, of course, a substantial one and its granting is manda-
tory upon the court. Final hearings are not set until the child is at
least one month of age, and there has been ample time for the taking
and reporting of the tests.188 There is considerable evidence that ad-
missions of paternity frequently are made in error because of the re-
sults of blood tests.'18 7 A court may order blood tests upon its own
motion in the absence of specific statutory authority. s8 8 Fees are ad-
vanced by the County in accordance with the statute; hence, the indigent
is not deprived of the right to a blood test.
Some difficulty occurs when the infant child has been adopted
prior to the testing because of the policy against disclosure of the
identity of adoptive parents. Usually, arrangements can be made to
have the child appear at the clinic at a different date than the parties
to the dispute so that the identity of the adoptive parents is not di-
vulged.
The statutes provide that all arrangements are to be made by the
requesting party and failure to have the test performed before trial
constitutes a waiver unless there is a good cause to the contrary. It
is generally held that a delay in requesting blood tests constitutes a
waiver within the discretion of the court. 8 9
As first written the statute did not make an exclusion conclusive
proof of non-paternity.190 In Prochnow v. Prochnow'911 a trial court,
upon a record establishing intercourse between husband and wife dur-
ing the conceptive period, found the husband to be the father of a child
185 State ex rel. Carley v. Riche, Milwaukee County Court, XR 13-245.
186 For a comparable policy followed in other jurisdictions, see Fowler v. Rizzuto,
121 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Ct. of Special Sessions, 1953); Gilpin v. Gilpin, 197 Misc.
319, 94 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1950).
187 Sussman, supra note 167, at 38.
188 State v. Eli, 62 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1954) ; Parsons v. Parsons, 197 Ore. 420,
253 P.2d 914 (1953) ; State ex rel. Wollock v. Brigham, 72 S.D. 278, 33 N.W.2d
285 (1948).
189 Adams v. District of Columbia, 109 A.2d 140 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1954);
Commonwealth v. Dean, 172 Pa. Super. 415, 94 A.2d 59 (1953) ; Jensen v.
Jensen, 13 N.J. Super. 155, 80 A.2d 244 (1951).
190 WIS STAT. §325.23 (1935).
191 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1956).
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despite his exclusion by blood tests. Upon appeal the decision was
sustained by a 4-3 majority. Although recognizing the possibility of
human error in blood testing as in other procedures, the minority of the
court urged that they should not wait for the Legislature to take the
initiative to adopt what science conclusively establishes as factual.
A few years later the Legislature made proof of non-paternity by blood
tests conclusive evidence.
Because of the remote possibilities that an exception may occur to
the genetic laws, complete accuracy has not always been claimed; how-
ever, it has been estimated that exclusionary results are correct in 99.99
per cent or more of the cases.' 92 This almost absolute certainty when
compared to a determination based upon problematical circumstantial
evidence and the credibility of the respective parties justifies the evi-
dentiary force accorded by the Legislature. Courts have taken judicial
notice of medical opinions and legal authorities recognizing the re-
liability, accuracy, and value of blood test exclusions. 93 Because science
cannot positively establish as yet who is the father, a non-exclusionary
result generally has no probative value and is inadmissible. As a matter
of fact, the admission into evidence of a non-exclusionary result is
prejudicial error in most jurisdictions. This is because an aura of medi-
cal fact may be attached to it by the jury, thus misleading it to believe
that the tests do have probative value. 9 4
This is in great contrast to the trial of paternity actions under
Danish law. Although all are not used, eleven systems of blood group-
ings are recognized by the University Institute of Forensic Medicine
of Copenhagen. Information obtained from blood tests may be to the
effect that the putative father (1) cannot be excluded because the
tests yield information neither for or against paternity, (2) cannot be
excluded but corroborates the assumption of non-paternity to a greater
or lesser degree, (3) cannot be excluded and the blood tests corrobor-
ates the assumption of his paternity to a greater or lesser degree, or (4)
paternity is excluded which information, however, may be of varying
reliability according to the system and exclusion type in question. Ac-
quittals may be had if the circumstances indicate the defendant's pater-
nity to be "little probable." If two men are involved, a judgment of
192 Ross, supra note 180, at 468.
193 United States ex- rel. Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 116 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950);
Comm'r. of Welfare ex rel. Tyler v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N.Y.S.2d
804 (1950).
194 State ex rel. Isham v. Mullally, 15 Wis.2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701 (1961)
People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 67 N.W.2d 230 (1954) ; Miller v. Domanski,
26 N.J. Super. 316, 97 A.2d 641 (1953); State ex rel. Freeman v. Morris,
156 Ohio St. 333, 102 N.E.2d 450 (1951) ; Houston v. Houston, 199 Misc. 469,
99 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1950); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 191 Misc. 236, 77 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1948).
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paternity can be made if the paternity of one man is "more probable
than the paternity of any other man in the case.' 195
The Uniform Blood Test Act recognizes the advancement in the
field of blood tests by making admissible an expert opinion that the
blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity because
of the infrequent blood type found to be present. The admissibility of
the opinion rests in the court's discretion. 98
A final question to be considered is whether one can be ordered
to take a blood test against his will. Upon this issue two United States
Supreme Court cases are usually cited for consideration of the due
process problem. The forcible use of a stomach pump to secure evidence
of narcotics from the person of a suspect has been held violative of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 197 But the taking of a
blood test by a skilled technician from one who was unconscious was
held not to be "conduct that shocks the conscience" or offends a "sense
of justice."'' 98 Justice Clark writing for the majority stated:
Furthermore, since our criminal law is to no small extent
justified by the assumption of deterrence, the individual's right
to immunity from such invasion of the body as is involved in
a properly safeguarded blood test is far outweighed by the
value of its deterrent effect due to public realization that the
issue of driving while under the influence of alcohol can often
by this method be taken out of the confusion of conflicting
contentions. 99
Three members of the Court dissented.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the taking of blood
tests in drunken driving or homicide cases does not violate the state
constitution in reference to the privilege against self-incrimination. 200
The taking of blood for a test while a defendant in a criminal action
was in an unconscious or semi-conscious state and not under arrest
has been held to violate the state constitution as an unreasonable search
and seizure, because the defendant was not under arrest. 2 1 It was also
held that the circumstances there constituted a violation of the due
process clause; however that statement was withdrawn on rehearing.
It should be noted that the Kroening case precedes the Breithaupt case
in point of time. Other state courts have held that the use in evidence
of blood tests taken against a defendant's will does not violate one's
195 HENNINGSEN, supra note 169, at 220.
196 See Commissioners' Prefatory Notes, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 102.
19 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
198 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1956).
199 Id. at 440-41.
200 State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 80 N.VW.2d 816 (1956) ; City of Barron v.
Covey, 271 Wis. 10, 72 N.W.2d 387 (1955).
201 State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 80 N.W.2d 816 (1956).
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right against self-incrimination, 20 2 against unreasonable search and
seizure,20 3 of due process, 204 and/or his right of privacy.20 5
The effect of the statutory provision that the fact of a refusal of a
party to submit to a test may be disclosed on trial was considered by
a Milwaukee County circuit court recently.20 6 In that matter the guard-
ian ad litem of a child whose paternity was challenged in a divorce
proceeding objected to submitting the child to a blood test for the
reason that such might destroy the presumption of legitimacy. It was
argued that the exclusive remedy provided by the legislature was that
the fact of the refusal could be introduced into evidence. The court
held that the statute provided an evidentiary alternative which permitted
the requesting party to insist upon a court order for a blood test, or to
merely stand upon his right to call this fact to the attention of the
trier of the fact.
A New Jersey court has interpreted similar statutory language not
to imply a privilege of declination to submit to a blood test in a pater-
nity action.20 7 The uniform act on blood tests to determine paternity
provides that if any party in a civil action refuses to submit to a blood
test the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party
or enforce its order if the rights or interests of justice so require.2 8
Of course, a person may be deprived of his right to a blood test if
the child dies before a test can be made.
When Did It Happen?-Duration of Pregnancy
If none of the foregoing defenses are available to the defendant,
he remains confronted with the complainant's testimony that he had
sexual relations with her during the conceptive period. Before the trier
can make a finding of paternity it must be satisfied that the defendant
had sexual intercourse with the complainant during a time which in the
ordinary course of nature would have caused the conception.2 0 9 If the
complainant's testimony concerning the time of the defendant's alleged
impregnating act is incompatible with medical science, the credibility of
her evidence is either destroyed or shaken to the extent of its improba-
bility. The improbability might be sufficient to result in a failure to
fulfill the required burden of proof. 10 Thus the inquiry requires a
202 State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Statti,
166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950) ; Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A.2d
289 (1948).
203 State v. Alexander, supra note 202.
204 State v. Alexander, supra note 202; United States ex rel. Dong Wing Ott v.
Shaughnessy, 116 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).202 State v. Alexander, supra note 202.
206 Fairbanks v. Fairbanks, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 310-829 (1964).
207 Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
20S 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 102.
209 Sonnenberg v. State, 124 Wis. 124, 102 N.W. 233 (1905).
21o State ex rel. Isham v. M'ullally, 15 Wis.2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701 (1961), (clear
and satisfactory preponderance) ; Gillis v. State, 206 Wis. 150, 238 N.W. 804(1931), (beyond reasonable doubt).
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medical determination of when the complainant became "enciente with
child." Because the date of birth usually is readily established and not
in issue, the determination of time of conception depends upon the
actual duration of the pregnancy. In the aptly descriptive words of
one writer, the problem becomes one of the "mathematics of mother-
hood," or man's law of paternity versus nature's laws of gestation. "'
Section 891.395 provides as follows:
In any paternity proceeding, where the child whose paternity
is at issue weighed 5Y2 pounds or more at the time of its birth,
the testimony of the mother as to such weight shall be presump-
tive evidence that the child was a full term child, unless compe-
tent evidence to the contrary is presented to the court. The
conception of such child shall be presumed to have occurred
within a span of time extending from 240 days to 300 days
before the date of its birth, unless competent evidence to the
contrary is presented to the court.
Weight is medically and legally taken as the main index of the gestative
age with 52 pounds being the upper limit of prematurity. This figure
is -based upon statistical studies and upon experience demonstrating
that if all other things are equal such infants can survive as well as
larger infants.2 12
Length is also a guide to the gestative maturity of the child. The
average length of white males at birth is twenty inches; females and
Negro infants are slightly shorter. The lower limit of the length of a
normal term infant is set at eighteen inches. There is some divergence
of opinion as to whether length or weight is a better index to the ma-
turity of the newborn infant. 213 It is interesting to note that Negro
babies weigh about one-half pound less than white babies and are
slightly shorter.214 Such fact might have legal significance in a given
case concerning the operation of the statutory presumptive period of
gestation.
These figures are approximations and some full term infants might
not attain such sizes or weights. Weight and length might be affected
by illness of the mother. The presumption by its terms yields to medical
testimony. Furthermore, a child physically normal can result from a
pregnancy which ended five weeks earlier or later than the normal term,
and an eight month child can be as mature as a full term child. Lack
of hair or incompletely developed fingernails or toenails are also evi-
dence of prematureness. 215
The average duration of a pregnancy or a normal period of gestation
211 Peer, Mathematics of Motherhood, POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE, Vol. 28, p. 48,
Vol. 29, p. 44 (1960 and 1961).
212 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 1066 (12th ed. 1961).
213 See EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 1066 and Culiner, Traluma
to the Unborn Child, 5 TRAUMA No. 1, 34 (1963).
214 Culiner, sitpra note 213, at 34.
215 Daegling v. State, 56 Wis. 586, 14 N.A'. 593 (1883).
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is 280 days, 40 weeks, or ten lunar months as measured from the first
day of the last menstruation period to birth. The average duration is
282 days.21 6 Usually the complainant's history of her last menstrural
period is unreliable. Hence a calculation from that point is untrust-
worthy and the importance of the statutory presumption becomes mani-
fest. The interval between the first day of menstruation" 7 and ovulation
averages thirteen days. Ovulation is the process of the maturation of an
ovum, the reproductive cell of the female, and its escape from the
ovary into the uterine tube where it is available for fertilization for
about fifteen to sixteen days. 218 Thereafter menstruation occurs and the
cycle is repeated.
The mean duration of actual pregnancy counting from the day of
conception is thought to be 267 days219 and averages between 266-270
or 268-272 days depending upon the statistical study used. 22 ° These
averages are not critical because variations in the duration of preg-
nancies are great. Pregnancy occurs usually from 24 to 48 hours after
intercourse 221 but can occur as late as 60 hours thereafter. 222
It is customary to estimate the expected delivery date by counting
back three months from first day of last menstrural period and adding
seven days. This rule of thumb which is referred to as Naegle's rule
and the aforementioned averages are not critical because studies reveal
that only five per cent of pregnant women deliver on the calculated
day, 35 per cent deviate one to five days either way, and the majority
deliver beyond these periods. Prolongation by two or three weeks is
common.2 23 For slightly different but generally confirming data, see
Trauna to the Unborn Child.2
24
These variations occur because ovulation does not consistently occur
at the same time during the cycle, and because the menstrual cycle it-
self varies. The average menstrual cycle is twenty-eight days, but there
216 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 221; see Culiner, supra note
213, at 31; State ex rel. Isham v. Mullally, 15 Wis.2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701
(1961); Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952); State v. Van
Patten, 236 Wis. 186, 294 N.W. 560 (1940) ; Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo.
App. 278, 203 S.W.2d 89 (1947) ; Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal. App.2d 15, 122
P.2d 308 (1942); Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482
(1937) ; In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919).
217 Menstruation is defined as the periodical physiological discharge of blood,
mucous, and cellular debris from the uterine mucosa at more or less regular
intervals except during pregnancy or lactation from puberty to menopause.
218 See Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 171 (1949).
219 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 221.
22o See EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 221 and Culiner, supra
note 213, at 30, 31.
221Peer, Mathematics of Motherhood, 29 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 44 (1961);
GONZALES, VANCE, HELPERN & UMBERGER, LEGAL MEDICINE, PATHOLOGY _&
ToxicoLOGy 562 (2d ed. 1954).
222 ISRAEL, MENSTRUAL DISORDERs & STERILITY 563 (4th ed. 1959).
223 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 221.
224 Culiner, supra note 213, at 31.
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is no perfect regularity. The average normal menstrual duration is
from four to six days; a two to eight day period is physiological.2 2 5
The courts have recognized that almost all children are born after
280 days or within one or two weeks of that point.228 Anything beyond
300 days is quite exceptional, and each day thereafter intensifies the
exceptional character of the pregnancy. 27 It has been said that there
are authenticated cases when the period exceeded 320 days. Instances
have been vouched for by reputable authorities in which the pregnancy
exceeded 330 days ;228 however, these cases are usually suspect medical-
ly because of possible menstrual irregularities, or because the mother
might have been mistaken concerning the date of her last period. 2 0
Schatkin also reports pregnancies known to extend 323, 324, and 336
days.230 In actions challenging the legitimacy of a child, the English
courts have recognized pregnancies asserted to have been from 331
to 346 days.2 31 Our courts have accepted as true alleged durations of
299 to 336 days and in other circumstances rejected those alleged to
last from 305 to 365 days.2 32
Prolonged pregnancies have been associated with anencephalic
infants. Medical authorities report the termination of a pregnancy in-
volving such a child after one year and 24 days after the last menstrual
period.233
Conception may take place during a period of amenorrhea, absence
of menses, and particularly during lactation; hence in those situations
calculation by Naegle's rule is foreclosed.
It must be emphasized that the statutory presumption of the con-
ceptive period applies only when there is no medical testimony to the
contrary. Prior to the enactment of the statute, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court on several occasions held it error for the trial court to instruct
or guide itself by what it thought the normal period to be when there
was medical evidence to the contrary. An instruction that 270 to 290
days was the period of gestation was held to be in error when the only
evidence was that of a doctor who stated that the period of gestation
may vary from 230 to 320 days.23 4 The court's use of medical evidence
given in another case to the effect that the period of gestation may vary
225 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 111.
220 Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S.W.2d 89 (1947).
22T In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919).
228 Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 171 (1949) ; Boudinier v. Boudinier,
240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S.W.2d 89 (1947) ; In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal.
82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919).
229 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 334.
230 SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 538-41 (3rd ed. 1933).
231 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra note 212, at 202 and Culiner, supra note
213 at 31.
232 Peer, Mathematics of Motherhood, 28 POSTGRADUATE MEDINE 50 (1960).
233 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, op. cit. supra.note 212, at 223; Culiner, supra note 213,
at 31.
234 State v. VanPatten, 236 Wis. 186, 294 N.W. 560 (1940).
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from 230 days to 320 days, when there was medical testimony in the
case before it that the period of pregnancy was 266 days and that
the probable date of birth is determined by counting 280 days forward
from the first day of the last menstruation, was also held to be error.
2 35
The importance of medical testimony of the duration of pregnancy
as a fact independent of the complainant's testimony, and its compat-
ibility or inconsistency with her testimony as related to the burden of
proof is demonstrated by a number of Wisconsin cases. In Shewalter
v. Shewalter23 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found upon medical
testimony that a gestation period of 243 days resulting in a normal full
term child was within the field of medical probability. On the other
hand, upon the testimony of the complaining witness that her pregnancy
was normal and that the child was born 320 days after the alleged in-
tercourse, it was held that the defendant could not be the father beyond
a reasonable doubt in the absence of medical evidence of a protracted
pregnancy. 23 7 Similarly, medical evidence of a prolonged pregnancy or
delayed birth was held to be necessary to convert a medical possibility
into a factual probability when the alleged act of intercourse or con-
ception was claimed by the complainant to have been 309 days before
birth.23 8 The court recognized the medical fact that conception can take
place beyond the limits designated by the statute, but held that com-
plainant's testimony to that effect created a mere possibility which
does not meet the burden of a clear and satisfactory preponderance of
the evidence in the absence of supporting medical testimony. These
cases also demonstrate the yielding of the statutory presumption of the
time of conception to medical testimony and its weight and operation in
the absence of medical testimony.
It is not necessary, of course, to establish the exact date of inter-
course. A finding of paternity will be sustained, if the act is proven
to have occurred within the statutory period239 or that period estab-
lished by competent medical testimony. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
early in its history, stated that the birth of a child is liable to be ac-
celerated or delayed by circumstances, and the question of when the
complainant became pregnant is purely one of fact to be decided upon
all of the evidence. 240
For similar reasons a New York court241 refused to make a finding
of adultery even though it appeared there was no access by the husband,
who had left the country 355 days prior to the birth of a child. Al-
235 Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952).
2 259 Wis. 636,49 N.W2d 727 (1951).
2 Gillis v. State, 206 Wis. 150, 238 N.W. 804 (1931).
238 State er rel. Isham v .Mullally, 15 Wis.2d 249, 112 N.W.2d 701 (1961).
239 Ibid.
240 Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 39, 33 N.W. 52, 55 (1887), citing 2 GREENLEAF,
EVIDENCE §152.
241 Lockwood v. Lockwood, 62 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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though the average duration of a pregnancy is 265-272 days and any-
thing beyond 300 days is exceptional, there was medical evidence of a
delayed birth. A medical question as to whether the last forty days were
a part of the period of gestation or due to difficulty in delivering the
child, was present.
Presumptive signs of pregnancy are cessation of the menses,
changes in the breasts, morning sickness, quickening, discoloration of
the mucous membranes of the vagina, abnormalities of pigmentation,
disturbances in urination, and fatigue.242 In a healthy married woman
who previously menstruated regularly, cessation thereof strongly sug-
gests pregnancy. No great reliance should be put thereon until the lapse
of ten days. Probable pregnancy is indicated after a second period is
missed. Absence or delay of a menstrual period at this stage may be
explained because of psychic influence, change of climate, disease, or
fear of pregnancy.24 3
It is not uncommon that a pregnant woman might have one or two
episodes of a bloody discharge during the first one-half of her preg-
nancy. Apparently, such is more common among women who have
borne 'children previously.24 4 Claims of menstruation throughout preg-
nancy are of doubtful authenticity and probably pathological. The
Missouri Supreme Court has considered that continued menstruation
or bleeding at regular periods as many as three times after pregnancy
to be possible.2
45
Evidence that the complainant was unaware of her pregnant condi-
tion has been considered in several cases. A doctor's testimony that it
was possible for a girl nineteen years of age to mistake pregnancy for
another ailment up to the date of delivery was held to be competent.
The doctor testified that he had seen at least three cases in his own
practice where the mother did not know she was pregnant until the
day of delivery.2 46 Failure to comment upon or reveal a pregnant con-
dition on the part of the complainant as a circumstance casting sus-
picion upon her story has been discounted because of evidence that the
pregnancy did not change her appearance due to her great normal
weight.2
47
In the absence of medical testimony, the courts have frequently
resorted to taking judicial notice of certain of these medical facts. The
California Supreme Court has held that while the period of gestation
is one of fact, it is an operation of natural laws and therefore is a fact
of which the court may take judicial notice. Thus the court is not
confined to the evidence in the record, but may seek information else-
242 EASTMAN & HILLMAN, Op cit. supra note 212, at 275.
243 Ibd.
244 Ibid.24 5Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S.W.2d 89 (1947).
246 State v. Willing, 259 Wis. 395, 48 N.W.2d 236 (1951).
247 State v. Bishop, 255 Wis. 416, 39 N.W.2d 399 (1949).
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where, and particularly in published technical works and articles by
those recognized as authorities in this branch of human knowledge. 24
It has been held by the Massachusetts Supreme Court that a judge as
a trier of fact was entitled to take into consideration with the evidence
of record other facts which were matters of common knowledge relat-
ing to the operation of nature. Hence, the possibility of some variation
from the normal length of period of gestation was recognized as being
a matter of common knowledge. However, the time to which the period
might possibly extend is not a matter of common knowledge, if indeed
it is a matter of exact scientific knowledge.2 4 9 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has refused to consider excerpts from medical texts on appeal
which were not used in the trial and therefore not part of the record.
It was held that on a hearing of a writ of error which brought only the
record before it, such use of medical texts was to be excluded.250
Obviously, the process of conception is a hidden one, and the organs
perform their appropriate functions without the volition of the female
and without her being conscious that the process is occurring. This
leads to the rule that where the complainant has had intercourse with
more than one man during the possible conceptive period, and a child
has resulted, neither she nor anyone else can say with reasonable cer-
tainty as to who the father is. Any weighing of probabilities under
such circumstances is but a matter of speculation.25' This fact was
recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1879 in Baker v.
State,252 and the rule has been followed in a number of subsequent
cases.253 The rule would not apply, of course, in situations where the
other man or men are eliminated by blood tests, racial or other possible
hereditary characteristics.
A determination of the conceptive period also may become important
in the event of a claim of sterility on the part of the defendant. Expert
testimony based upon a history of mumps affecting the defendant's
testicles, and a sterile semen specimen taken 21 months after the be-
ginning of the complainant's conceptive period was held to warrant
a dismissal where the mumps were contracted prior to the conception
of the complainant's child.254 The trial court's conclusion that sterility
resulting from mumps was so well established to be intermittent that
judicial notice could be taken thereof was rejected by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, because there was expert testimony that the sterility
existed and was constant.
24Sln re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919).
249 Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482 (1927).
250 Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952).
251 In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919).
25247 Wis. 111, 2 N.W. 110 (1879).
253 Johnson v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.W. 674 (1907); Busse v. State, 129
Wis. 171, 108 N.W. 64 (1906); Daegling v. State, 56 Wis. 586, 14 N.W. 593
(1883).
254 Timm v. State, 262 Wis. 162, 54 N.W.2d 46 (1952).
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The mathematics of motherhood provide no rules of easy application
to exclude paternity, but they do provide a means of measuring allega-
tions in terms of probabilities, improbabilities, or certainties. Therefore,
they have an important bearing upon the weighing of the credibility of
evidence relating to the degree of proof required to sustain a finding of
paternity.
Resemblance
Other than in blood testing, the use of heritable traits to determine
paternity is presently largely limited to racial and unusual physical
traits. Although individual traits as hair color, eye color, body build,
head shape, and facial features are determined by heredity, so many
other genetic and environmental factors are involved that resemblance
of such traits in father and child is an unreliable means of determining
parentage.25 5 A startling statement to the contrary is that of Fredrich
Keiter of the University of Wurzburg, Hamburg, Germany. He states
that the data now at the disposal of the physical anthropologist contains
sufficient information to determine accurately nineteen out of twenty
times whether an individual is or is not the parent of a child in
question. Such anthropological paternity testing is done by the poly-
symptomatic combination of "critical values" of the various heritable
traits of which there are seventy usable traits including those used in
blood grouping.256
Since early times mankind has recognized that frequently the
physical appearance of a parent is passed on to the child. Nevertheless
there is a substantial conflict of authority concerning the admissibility
of evidence of physical resemblance or dissimilitude of the child to the
putative father to determine paternity.257 The reasons for the rule
against admissibility of evidence of resemblance are set forth in Clark
v. Bradstreet.2 58 The Maine Supreme Court conceded that it may be a
well known physiological fact that the peculiarities of form, features,
and personal traits are often times transmitted from parent to child.
However, the court held that it is equally true as a matter of common
knowledge that the features of an infant change and that resemblance
is readily imagined.
Professor Wigmore contends that the sound rule is to admit the
fact of similarity of specific traits, either by testimony or by presen-
tation of the child in court provided the child is, in the opinion of the
trial court, old enough to possess settled features or other corporeal
indications. 25 Many courts, while aware of the danger that a jury might
255 Wiener, Parentage and Blood Groups, SaENTnIC AMFRIcAN, July 1954.
256 Keiter, Advances in Anthropological Paternity Testing, NS 21 American J.
of Physical Anthropology 81 (1963).
257Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97 (1926), Annot., 95 A.L.R. 309 (1935).
25880 Me. 454, 456 (1888); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97, 137 (1926); Annot., 95 A.L.R.
309, 317 (1935).
259 1. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §166 (3rd ed. 1940).
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find a fanciful or notional resemblance of the child to the putative
father, nevertheless, will permit evidence of similarity of specific traits
when the child is old enough to have settled features.260 Some courts
permit such proof without limitation,261 and others hold that the youth
of the child goes to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibil-
ity.2
62
Very early in its history, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that a child of less than one year could not be exhibited to a jury to
prove resemblance on the theory that such evidence is too uncertain
and fanciful. 26 However, it has been held not to be error to permit
the complaining witness to hold the child while giving testimony when
there was no attempt to exhibit the child to the jury. 2 64 Wisconsin
recognizes an exception when the appearance of the child demonstrates
a dissimilitude because of distinctive racial features inconsistent with
parentage of the mother and the putative father.265
Generally, in those states which do admit evidence of resemblance,
an exception is made when specific or particular marked physical
characteristics are present. Wisconsin has indicated that it would be
unwise to place too great a reliance upon like malformations found in
both father and child.26G Corporeal peculiarities which have been con-
sidered to be hereditary include peculiarly shaped ear tips,267 presence
of supernumerary fingers,266 but not color of hair even though distinc-
tive.260
In a 1951 Swiss paternity action, the use of expert testimony of
hereditary likeness between the child and father to corroborate the
complainant's assertions that the defendant was the father was approved
by its high court, the Bundesgericht. The basis of the expert's testimony
was likeness in skin, hair properties, eyebrows, color and structure of
the iris of the eye, nose, mouth, chin, whole face, form of head, shape
of ears, fingerprints, and an anomaly in the upper jaw structure. 7 0
2,6" Lohsen v. Lawson, 106 Vt. 481, 174 Atl. 861 (1934) ; Flores v. State, 72 Fla.
302, 73 So. 234 (1916) ; Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97, 119 (1926) ; Annot., 95 A.L.R.
309,316 (1935).
261 Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97, 112 (1926) ; Annot., 95 A.L.R. 314, 315 (1935).
2r2 Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, 26 N.E. 871 (1891); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97,
152 (1926) ; Annot., 95 A.L.R. 314, 319 (1935).
263 Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885).
26r4 State ex rel. Sarnowski v. Fox, 19 Wis.2d 68, 119 N.W.2d 451 (1963) ; John-
son v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.W. 674 (1907); Hofer v. State, 130 Wis.
576, 110 N.W. 391 (1907).
265 Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885); Annot., 31 A.L.R. 1119
(1924); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97, 130 (1926); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 314, 316 (1935).266 Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885).
267 Lawhead v. State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 Pac. 376 (1924).
26S People v. Kingcannon, 276 Ill. 251, 114 N.E. 508 (1916).
269 Zell v. State, 15 Ohio App. 466 (1922).
276 Federal Court Permi'ts Anthropologicoheredobiologic Proof of Paternity, 91
SCHWIEZORISExz, MEDIZINISCHE, WOCHENSCHRIFT, Part 2, 1541-42 (1961);
See Hooton, Medico-Legal Aspects of Physical Anthropology, 15 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 208 (1942).
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Proof of general resemblance is of limited practical significance,
because most cases are tried during the child's infancy while there
has not been sufficiant physical development to enable the layman to
discern likeness or dissimilitude except possibly in reference to race.2 7 '
Paternity trials are usually required to be held while the child is quite
young because of the operation of the statute of limitations. 7 2 It may
well be that the anthropologist as an expert can discern the critical
hereditary traits in the physically developed infant and provide proba-
tive evidence in the resolution of paternity actions, but at the present
time such proof has little significance in the trial of paternity actions.
Deception Tests
Because the complainant's accusation and the defendant's denial
of intercourse between them is hardly a matter upon which either can
be mistaken, the existence of willful perjury is almost always involved.
Thus, there is a natural desire of the courts to resort to some absolute
or foolproof method of ascertaining the truth. Dean Wigmore has
written:
* . . judicial practice is entitled and bound to resort to all truths
of human nature established by science, and to employ all methods
recognized by scientists for applying those truths in the analysis
of testimonial credit.
Indeed, it may be asserted that the courts are ready to learn
and to use, whenever the psychologists produce it, any method
which the latter themselves are agreed is sound, accurate, and
practical. 2
7 3
LIE DETECTOR
The first mechanical deception testing technique which comes to
mind is the lie detector. It is reported that some of the courts in Los
Angeles and Cook counties have utilized polygraph tests in domestic
and paternity actions. 7 4 Arther and Ried also relate that judges of the
Chicago Court system have requested parties and witnesses to take the
lie detector tests after they have testified in paternity cases. In a
sample of 312 cases ninety-three per cent of the tested parties were
determined to have lied in some respect concerning the alleged sexual
relations. Sometimes complainants merely exaggerated the number of
271 Lay testimony has been permitted concerning a person's apparent race, and
juries have been allowed to consider such by exhibition of the child. 2 JONES,
EVIDENCE 756, 852. Perhaps the use of expert testimony for such proof might
be more prudent.
272 WIs. STAT. §893.195 (1965) provides that paternity actions must be com-
menced within five years of birth, but can be tolled by the issuance of a
warrant or complaint within such time.
273 111 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE 875 (3rd ed. 1940).
27' Pfaff, The Polygraph: An Invaluable Judicial Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 1130 (1964);
Arthur and Reid, Utilizing the Lie Delector Techniques To Determine The
Truth In Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 3. OF CRIM. LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, AND
POLICE SCIENCE 213 (1954).
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times they had intercourse during the conceptive period with the de-
fendant. Fifty-seven per cent of the male witnesses (other than the
defendants) who had testified that they too had had sexual relations
with the complainant during the conceptive period were found to have
lied.2 7 5 Judges who try many paternity cases are not startled by these
fiigures. In fact, they constitute the reason for a search of better proof
than testimonial evidence.
Judicial approval of the results of a lie detector test was first
sought in 1923.271 The court however then declined to admit the results
of a systolic blood pressure deception test, because such had not yet
gained general acceptance "among physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony
deduced from discovery, developments, and experiments thus far
made. '277 Although years have passed by, the courts continue to reject
testimony of the results of lie dectector tests because they have not yet
attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascer-
taining the truth . 2 7 Other objections are: the trier, particularly juries,
might place too great a weight upon the examiner's interpretations of
the results; such evidence violates the hearsay rule and usurps the
function of the jury; and mandatory tests violate due process and the
right against self-incrimination.
Although a number of trial courts have received evidence regard-
ing the use and results of lie detector tests where the parties have
stipulated to such 2 7 9 the appellate courts which have considered the
question of stipulation are divided in opinion. California, Iowa
and Arizona admit such testimony,2 0 Kansas has implied it would ad-
mit such evidence, 28 , and Wisconsin, Michigan, Kentucky, New Mex-
ico, and Illinois have rejected it.282 The Kentucky court rejected the
275 Arthur and Reid, supra note 274.
276 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
277 Id. at 1014.
278 Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963); People v.
Zazzetta, 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963) ; State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J.Super.
483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir.
1959); People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App.2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1958); Lee v.
Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1958); Colbert v. Common-
wealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Hawkins v. State, 222 Miss.
753, 77 So.2d 263 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 179 Pa.Super. 64, 115
A.2d 865 (1955); Peterson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 255, 247 S.W.2d 110(1952); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951) ; People v.
Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950) ; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860,
46 N.W.2d 508 (1950) ; Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) ;
State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) ; State v. Cole, 354 Mo.
181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945) ; People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503
(1942).
279 See Comment, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 430.
280 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) ; State v. McNamara, 252
Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960) ; People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App.2d 686, 193
P.2d 937 (1948).
281 State v. Lowry, 163 Kans. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947).
282 People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 .N.E.2d 260 (1963) ; State v. Trimble,
68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d
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evidence because of the character of the stipulation, and the Wisconsin
case is generally regarded to have been decided for the same reason.28 3
A proper stipulation for the use of such evidence should contain the
agreement to submit to the test, designate the examiner, set forth the
purpose, and stipulate to admissibility of results in the form of an
opinion. It should permit the examiner to state his qualifications, pro-
cedure used, and the reasons for his opinions. Cross examination should
be permitted. To avoid subsequent problems the matter of how expenses
are to be paid should be determined. Finally, it should also contain a
declaration that the parties understand that they are under no legal
compulsion to submit to the tests. If the case is to be tried to a jury,
it should be agreed that the court shall instruct the jury regarding the
terms of the agreement and that the opinion should not be accepted as
conclusive, but that it is to be considered with all of the evidence
and be given that weight they believe it entitled.
Asking a witness whether he made himself available for a lie de-
tector test has uniformly been held improper but not necessarily
prejudicial error.5 4 Similarly, a revelation or intimation by counsel to
the jury that tests were taken is error, but such might not require
reversal. 282 The inadmissibility of evidence of offers to submit to or
of refusal to take a lie detector test follows as a corollary to the rule
that the results of the tests are inadmissible.288 Applications by a party
for the right to be administered a lie detector test have been denied.2 7
Section 165.01(3) (a) provides that the state crime laboratory is
to provide technical assistance to local officers, including services in
the field of lie detector or deception tests. The statute further provides
that upon a defendant's request in a felony case, and the court's ap-
proval, the department shall conduct analysis of a defendant's evidence
in his behalf.288 It has been held that this section does not require the
laboratory to give a lie detector test to the defendant upon his request.289
825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172(1951) ; LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).282 Comment, 6 S.D. L. REv. 136 (1961); Note, 15 ALA. L. Rav. 248 (1963);
Comment, 41 CHI.-KENT. L. Rav. 115 (1964). But see Comment, 1943 Wis. L.
RIv. 430, 442.284 State v. Baker, 16 Wis.2d 364, 114 N.W.2d 426 (1962); Kaminski v. State,
63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
285 People v. Adams, 182 Cal. App.2d 27 (1960); People v. Parrella, 158 Cal.
App.2d 140, 322 P.2d 83 (1959) ; Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d
451 (1958); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 (1958); People v.Schiers, 160 Cal. App.2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1958) ; People v. Aragon, 154 Cal.App.2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957) ; Leeks v. State, 950 Okla. Crim. 326, 245 P.2d
764 (1952) ; State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952) ; People
v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App2d 124, 219 P2d 70 (1950).
286People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 212 P.2d 665 (1957); Commonwealth v.
Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn.
209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952).287 State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7, (Mo. 1957) ; State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188
S.W.2d 43, inotion to rehear denied, 189 S.W.2d 541 (1945).
288 WIS. STAT. §165.04(1) (1965).
289 State v. Perlin, 268 Wis. 529, 68 N.W.2d 32 (1955). Dr. Sheppard in the cele-
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Confessions made after one has voluntarily submitted to a lie de-
tector test have been held admissible. 290 If the test is used as part of a
coercive interrogation or applied without consent, then such a confes-
sion is not admissible.291
Due to the reasons for which the courts have rejected evidence of
lie detector tests, their use in paternity cases in the future is doubtful.
Perhaps there may be some area of permissible use and utility in large
metropolitan court systems in which there is a substantial volume of
paternity cases. Their use may lie in a pre-trial screening or evaluation
process of the truthfulness of the complainant's story by the corpora-
tion counsel or by the district attorney's office. Overall, this may be
substantially less expensive than the present method of conducting
several hearings in each case. The tests need not be administered and
used as mental blackjacks. However, many charlatans have entered
the field and, to some degree, have discouraged a fresh reappraisal of
any use of the device.
2 92
Proponents of the use of lie detector tests argue that conscious
perjury is too often triumphant over our present methods of ascertain-
ing truth. Cross-examination requires cleverness and intuition not al-
ways possessed by the interrogator. Such skills, even when present, can
be of no avail against a shrewd witness. Judges and juries, habitually
and with the sanction of the law, make determinations of credibility
by interpreting changes of appearance, expression, voice, respiration,
or demeanor-just as the lie detector scientifically measures emotional
indicia which is subject to interpretation by a skilled examiner and
which may enable him to detect deception.
293
Twenty-five years ago conservative experts claimed seventy-five
per cent accuracy in detecting deception when the examination was
conducted by a trained examiner. They believe that in twenty per cent
of the cases the results were too indefinite or inconclusive for a defin-
ite diagnosis and that in the remaining five per cent the possibility of
erroneous diagnosis existed.294 More recent statistics cause its propQ-
nents to claim accuracy in 95 per cent of the cases, with four per cent
brated Sheppard murder case was denied the opportunity of a lie detector
test and hypnosis after conviction to show that he was not lying or to elicit
forgotten facts establishing his innocence. State ex rel. Sheppard v. Koblentz,
174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962). See. 77 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1963).
290o State v. Dehart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943) ; Tyler v. United States,
193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A2d
389 (1941) ; Commonwealth v. Hipple, 330 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939).
291 Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945) ; People v. Sims, 395 Ili.
69, 69 N.E2d 336 (1946).
292 Three states have adopted legislation requiring examiners to be licensed for
the purpose of assuring proper training, competency, and honesty. Smith-
Hurd Ill. Anno. Stats., ch. 38 §202 (1966); Ky. REv. STATs., ch. 329 (1963);
N.M. Stats., ch. 67, Act 31 (1965).
293 McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CAL. L. REv. 484
(1927).
294 INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 54.55 (1942).
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inconclusive results and a maximum possible error of one per cent.2 95
This is due to the improved technique. It has been observed that total
accuracy has never been used as a standard for other types of scien-
tific evidence.
296
TRUTH SERUMS-NARCOANALYSIS
The use of drugs to obtain confessions or information is said to
date back to 1200 B.C.297 Historically wine is credited with being a
"loosener of the tongue." Odysseus observed that wine even makes a
wise man "blurt out what had been better left unsaid," and the Latin
phrase "in vino veritas" translates to "the truth is in the wine.1129
8
Modern science is far more sophisticated, but as yet no court has
admitted statements obtained by interrogation conducted while the
subject was under the influence of a so-called truth serum. 299
The attitude of at least one court is expressed as follows: "This
court is not disposed to lead a safari into the jungle (i.e., revision of
the law of evidence) without first being satisfied that the new devices
to be employed have obtained full scientific acceptance."300
There is of course no such thing as a truth serum. Certain drugs
will induce a mental state of altered consciousness in which the indi-
vidual loses the ability to critically survey his responses to questions.
His answers are more or less automatic, and his capacity to associate
thoughts and choose those to which he desires to give utterance is in-
hibited. Some drugs produce delirium with vivid hallucinations or
confuse the subject's dreams and wishes with reality. Others produce
a state of narcosis in which the subject's mind is fairly clear, but in
which he is unable to critically censor any of his responses. This state
of narcosis is believed to be the truth telling level.301
Narcoanalysis has been used as an aid in psychiatric examinations.
The distinction is frequently made that statements obtained while the
subject was under narcoanalysis are not admissible to prove the truth
-
2 9 5
INBAu & RiED, LIE D~rEcrioN AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 111-12 (3rd ed.
1953); Harmon & Arthur, The Utilization of the Ried Polygraph By At-
torneys and The Courts, 2 CRIm. L. REv. 12 (1955); Arthur, The Lie De-
tector-Has It Any Value?, 24 FED. PROB. 36 (1960).
296 Note, Lie Detection--Admissibility Under Pre-Trial Stipulation, 15 ALA. L.
REv. 248 (1963).
297 Polen, The Admissibility of Truth Serum Tests, 35 TEMP. L. Q., 401 (1962).
198 See Depres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHL L. REV.
601 (1947) ; Moenssens, Narcoanalysis in Law Enforcement, 52 J. CRIm. LAw,
CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE 453 (1961).
299 Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); People v.
Jones, 52 Cal.2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959) ; State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 132
A.2d 298 (1957); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956);
State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285 P.2d 612 (1955) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56
N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952) ; Hendersofi v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230
P.2d 495 (1951) ; People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.2d 614, 234 P2d 1 (1951); People
v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App.2d 544, 224 P.2d 21 (1950); Orange v. Common-
wealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950); State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920
(Mo. 1926).
300 Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W2d 755, 757-58 (Ky. 1960).
301 Lorenz, Jr. 245 (1932).
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of the statement, but the psychiatrist may consider such information in
reaching his opinion as to the sanity of the defendant'- or to determine
if he was a sexual deviate.3 3 These inroads however do not portend the
admissibility of such statements to prove the truth of the fact stated.
HYPNOSIS
Statements made while under hypnosis have been excluded for the
same reasons that statements obtained under narcosis have been ex-
cluded. 30 4 The law does give some recognition to hypnosis in that it
has been held that the right of the accused to consult with his counsel
includes the right to have a hypnotist present." 5 These decisions are
grounded in part on the theory that the hypnotist might be an aid to
recall forgotten information beneficial to the defendant or to determine
sanity.
Circumstantial Evidence in Defense
In the absence of scientific evidence of deception tests, or to sup-
plement same, the defendant must resort to circumstantial evidence
which suggests his own innocence or the guilt of someone else. Basic-
ly, this falls into two principal categories. The first concerns proof of
intercourse with another man during the conceptive period, and the
second involves admissions of the complainant tending to exonerate
the defendant or which implicate someone else. Admissions have the
twofold function of impeaching the testimony of the complainant and
constituting affirmative evidence for the defendant.
ACTS WITH ANOTHER MAN
Proof of intercourse with another man during the conceptive period
entitles the defendant to an instruction that a finding of not guilty
must be returned if the jury believes that the complainant had such
intercourse at or about the time of the alleged conception. 30 6 This is
due to the doubt concerning which act of intercourse resulted in preg-
nancy. For example, in Baker v. State,30 7 the evidence was clear that
the defendant had sexual intercourse with the complainant at a time
nearer the termination of her menstruation period and further removed
from the birth of the child. The act of intercourse with the other man
was two weeks subsequent to that of the defendant. Because the
medical authorities indicated that the responsibility of one or the other
302 People v. Cartier, 51 Cal.2d 290, 335 P.2d 114 (1959) ; People v. Esposito,
287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
303 People v. Jones, 42 Cal.2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
304 State v. Pusch, 1 Dak 131, 46 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1950); People v. Ebanks, 117
Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049 (1897).
305 Cornell v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 52 Cal.2d 99, 338 P.2d 447
(1959) ; Ex parte Ochse, 38 Cal.2d 230, 238 P.2d 561 (1951).
306 Johnson v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.W. 674 (1907) ; Daegling v. State, 56
Wis. 586, 14 N.W. 593 (1883).
307 47 Wis. 111, 2 N.W. 110 (1879).
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was very questionable and was by no means without reasonable doubt,
the rule applied and a judgment of paternity could not be returned.
Although the rule was originally stated to the effect that the law
refuses to recognize the ability of the mother or anyone else to know
with any sufficient measure of certainty that the defendant is the father
beyond a reasonable doubt,308 it is applied today under rules which
permit a finding of paternity under a lesser quantum of proof.30 9
The rule of course does not apply, unless the act with the other
man is established to the satisfaction of the jury.3 10 As a result a verdict
holding the defendant to be the father was sustained although another
man testified to having sexual intercourse with the complainant during
the conception period.31 ' This testimony was denied by the complainant,
and there was other evidence supporting the verdict. Later the court
refused to reopen the trial upon an application based upon newly dis-
covered evidence which consisted of the subsequent conviction of such
witness for fornication based upon the intercourse with the complainant
to which he had admitted at the paternity trial. The court held that such
conviction was not admissible or conclusive in the paternity case.
Because the sole issue is whether or not the defendant is the father
of the child in question, the general rule is to limit such proof to acts
during the time of gestation.3 12 Related to this rule is the rule that the
reputation of the complainant for chastity is not admissible. Hence,
defendant's counsel cannot inquire of the complainant whether she
ever had intercourse with others,31 3 whether she has other children, or
when she had her first act of sexual intercourse; unless the court is
satisfied that such may have relevancy because it will be linked with
other evidence indicating the complicity of the defendant.
As noted earlier, direct proof of the act of intercourse by the com-
plainant and a particular man is rare; hence association with men other
than the defendant under suspicious circumstances affording an op-
portunity for sexual intercourse usually is the best evidence that the
defendant can hope to produce. The Milwaukee courts are inclined to
308 Busse v. State, 129 Wis. 171, 108 N.W. 64 (1906).
o See Wis. Jury Institutions-Criminal 2010.
310 Jacobsen v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 237 N.W. 142 (1931).
311 Johnson v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.W. 674 (1907).
312 I. v. D., 60 N.J. Super. 211, 158 A.2d 716 (1960) ; State v. Stevens, 248 Minn.
309, 80 N.W.2d 22 (1956); Huggins v. Campbell, 130 Colo. 183, 274 P.2d
324 (1954) ; Brasseau v. Padlo, 113 Vt. 300, 34 A.2d 186 (1943) ; Mensing v.
Croter, 209 Cal. 318, 287 Pac. 336 (1930) ; State v. Ferguson, 157 Wash. 19,
288 Pac. 239 (1930) ; Clark v. State, 144 Okla. 7, 289 Pac. 313 (1930) ; State
v. Stephon, 179 Minn. 80, 228 N.W. 335 (1929); Guy v. State, 20 Ala. App.
374, 102 So. 243 (1924) ; Dixon v. State, 88 Okla. 172, 212 Pac. 600 (1923) ;
Baehr v. State, 136 Md. 128, 110 At. 103 (1920) ; Seibert v. State, 133 Md.
309, 105 Atl. 161 (1918) ; DeMund v. State, 167 Wis. 40, 166 N.W. 328 (1918) ;
Brantley v. State, 11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914); State v. Reese, 43
Utah, 447, 135 Pac. 270 (1913) ; In re Gird's Estate, 157 Cal. 534, 108 Pac.
499, 137 Am. St. Rep. 131 (1910); Busse v. State, 129 Wis. 171, 108 N.W.
64 (1906); Duffies v. State, 7 Wis. 567 (1858).
313 Duffies v. State, supra note 312.
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permit the defendant to show mere association with other men as
preliminary to and upon the assumption that there will follow a show-
ing of circumstances reasonably imputing sexual intercourse. Unless
there is a good faith effort to do this, the courts can and will shut off
that line of testimony.
A good illustration of a court's application of these rules in a pa-
ternity trial is provided in State v. Patton.314 Upon cross-examination
the defendant's counsel persistently asked numerous questions concern-
ing the complainant's relationship with another man. The court con-
cluded that these questions were designed to impress upon the minds of
the jurors that certain damaging facts probably existed. A good faith
attempt to show such suggested facts actually existed was not made.
Citing other authority the court stated:
If counsel for defendant was able to produce any evidence tend-
ing to prove any of the facts implied by this adroit line of cross-
examination, it was incumbent upon him to do so in his own
case and not prove his case by cross-examination of prosecutrix
or her witnesses. 'Under the pretense of cross-examination of a
witness one party to an action cannot make out his case by wit-
nesses for the other side.' 315
In order to be admissible an association with another man or men
must be at improper or suspicious times and under circumstances from
which intercourse could be readily inferred.3 16 Mere opportunity for
intercourse is not very convincing,311 and something further than an
innocent relation or association between young people must be shown.318
A very apparent case of highly suspicious circumstances is a re-
cent case in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a jury
finding of no paternity. The evidence showed that the complainant
left a tavern after the closing time on three or four occasions with
different men during the probable conception period. What made
the evidence highly significant was the undisputed fact that the com-
plainant and the defendant had intercourse the very first night he
took her home from the tavern. There was no suggestion of a love af-
fair between the complainant and the defendant to distinguish her
relationship with him from that which might have existed between
her and the other men.319 Perhaps courts are inclined sometimes to
confine such evidence of association with another too rigidly to the
conceptive period because of the general rule and its corollary which
314 102 M ont. 51, 55 P.2d 1290 (1936).
315 Id. at 1292.
316Vogel v. State, 220 Wis. 677, 265 N.W. 567 (1936) ; DeMund v. State, 167
Wis. 40, 166 N.W. 328 (1918) ; Humphrey v. State, 78 Wis. 569, 47 N.W. 836
(1891) ; Baker v. State, 69 ,Vis. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887); Daegling v. State,
56 Wis. 586, 14 N.W. 593 (1883).
317 Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235 (1872).
318 Douglas v. State, 134 Wis. 627, 114 N.W. 1121 (1908).
3 State ex rel. Stollberg v. Crittenden, 29 Wis.2d 413, 139 N.W.2d 94 (1966).
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does not permit the complainant's reputation for chastity to be put
in issue.32
0
There is an exception to the general rule which permits proof of
illicit acts with other men outside of the conceptive period to be in-
troduced. If it can be shown that such intimacies and opportunities
continued after the child was begotten, evidence of an illicit relation-
ship prior to the conception period is admissible.32 ' Similarly, evi-
dence of a prior illicit relationship is admissible if it can be linked
with a suspicious current relationship so as to imply a resumption
of the former relationship. 22 The admissibility rests in the court's
discretionary determination of relevancy.3 23 Although the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court has held that evidence of the complainant's asso-
ciation with other men outside the conceptive period is inimaterial,
such is relevant to impeach complainant's testimony that she went
out with no one else once she started to associate with the defend-
ant.3
24
ADMISSIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT
Admissions of the complainant which tend to implicate another
man and thus exonerate the defendant can be by word, act, or si-
lence. Again, such evidence is usually circumstantial. It can be pro-
duced by the defendant affirmatively.
A promise to marry on the part of the defendant while the com-
plainant is pregnant has been held to corroborate other testimony
implicating the defendant.3 25 Conversely, engagement or marriage
to another man during pregnancy or shortly after the birth of the
child would appear to be relevant to the complicity of that man and
at least call for explanation.
A more frequent circumstantial admission occurs when the com-
plainant causes the birth certificate to indicate the father is "un-
known," uses the first name of her husband or of a boy friend with
whom she has had opporttnity for sexual relationship during the
conceptive period, or when it appears from the certificate that the
father's name has been changed or altered. In these instances it has
320 See notes 312, 313 supra and accompanying' text, and Steed v. State, 80 Ga.
App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 171 (1949).
321 State v. Rudy, 62 N.D. 403, 244 N.W. 28 (1932) ; State v. Stephon, 179 Minn.
80, 228 N.W. 335 (1929) ; Guy v. State, 20 Ala. App. 374, 102 So. 243 (1924) ;
Odenwald v. Woodsum, 142 Mass. 512, 8 N.E. 347 (1886); State v. Wood-
worth, 65 Iowa 141, 21 N.W. 490 (1884).
322 Mensing v. Croter, 209 Cal. 318, 287 Pac. 336 (1930) ; State v. Stephon, supra
note 321; Stahl v. State, 67 Kans. 864, 74 Pac. 238 (1903) ; State v. Borie, 79
Iowa 605,44 N.W. 824 (1890).
323 Odenwald v. Woodsum, 142 Mass. 512, 8 N.E. 347 (1886).
324 State v. Buss, 273 Wis. 134, 76 N.W.2d 541 (1956).
325 State v. Stephon, 179 Minn. 80, 228' N.W. 335 (1929) ; Moisch v. State, 128
Okla. 226, 262 Pac. 203 (1927); Leister v. State, 136 Md. 518, 111 AtI. 78(1920) ; Jones v. State, 132 Md. 142, 103 AtI. 459 (1918) ; Brantley v. State,
11 Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914).
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been held proper to permit the complainant to explain the apparent
discrepancy of her prior inconsistent statement.326
An accusation by the complainant charging another man with
responsibility or her statements implicating another man are ad-
missible.327 The complainant may be required to produce culpatory
letters in her possession from another man. However, her state-
ments in reference to other men made to the attorney who proceeds
in the paternity action on behalf of the public, such as the district
attorney, are within the attorney-client privilege.
328
The acts of another man implying his guilt are not binding upon
the complainant, unless she has in some way involved herself so that
her participation or acquiescence constitutes an admission on her
part. The same general rules relating to adoptive admissions by
silence apply to the complainant as well as the defendant.
Complainant's failure to inform the defendant upon learning of
her pregnant condition is frequently offered to exculpate the de-
fendant. The effect of such evidence is dependant upon the total
circumstances. The failure itself is not sufficient as a matter of law
to require a dismissal.329 On several occasions such evidence, when
coupled with an erroneous instruction, has been given sufficient
weight by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to cause it to reverse a de-
termination of paternity.
330
In State v. Van Patten the complainant failed to accuse the defend-
ant, until he was served with a complaint at the instance of her
parents although she knew where he lived and saw him at public
dances on several occasions. This fact, an erroneous instruction, and
the improbability of the circumstances under which the complainant
testified the act of intercourse took place caused the supreme court
to order a new trial.
In Vogel v. State the complainant failed to speak of her pregnancy
to or accuse the defendant, although she saw him daily and even
baby sat for him. There was also testimony of an opportunity under
suspicious circumstances for the complainant to have had inter-
course with another man.
Similarly, the failure of a nineteen year old school girl to seek
326Lee v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 A.2d 922 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1955); Com-
monwealth v. Charen, 177 Pa. Super. 522, 111 A.2d 155 (1955); Harrison v.
Dist. of Columbia, 95 A2d 332 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1953) ; State v. Bishop,
255 Wis. 416, 39 N.W.2d 399 (1949); Lawhead v. State, 99 Okla. 197, 226
Pac. 376 (1924).327 State v. Bishop, 255 Wis. 416, 39 N.W.2d 399 (1949) ; Nelson v. State, 210
Wis. 441, 245 N.W. 676 (1933); State v. Gabert, 41 S.D. 173, 169 N.W. 517(1918).
328 Ratzlaff v. State, 122 Okla. 263, 249 Pac. 934 (1926).
329 State ex rel. Syarto v. Barber, 268 Wis. 74, 66 N.W.2d 696 (1954).
330 State ex rel. Syarto v. Barber, supra note 329; State v. Van Patten, 236 Wis.
186, 294 N.W. 560 (1940) ; Vogel v. State, 220 Wis. 677, 265 N.W. 567 (1936).
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out and charge the defendant with responsibility after she became
pregnant and prior to the birth of the child was held to raise grave
doubts of the truth of complainant's charges, even though she had
informed him of her pregnancy and his responsibility when they
met without prearrangement at several social affairs they both at-
tended. The court believed her not to be "an ignorant unschooled
country maiden." There was also evidence that the complainant had
intercourse with another within the conceptive period and that she
had also sought to place the responsibility upon that person.3 31
Circumstances, however, may make the failure to accuse the de-
fendant immediately of no consequence.
In State v. Bishop33 2 complainant's pregnancy was not noticeable
due to her normal heavy weight. Under the circumstances the court
did not think her reticence concerning her condition to be suspicious
in the absence of comment or question by others. Despite the fact
that the complainant first accused another whose name appeared on
the birth certificate, the supreme court declined to hold as a matter
of law that there was reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The
verdict was supported by evidence which indicated that the com-
plainant was not responsible for the information on the birth certi-
ficate, defendant and complainant had opportunity to have inter-
course during the conceptive period, and the defendant had set up
drinks to honor the occasion of his "newborn son."
Because a doctor testified that he had three previous cases in
which the mother was unaware of her pregnancy until the birth of
of the child, it was held that the testimony of a nineteen year old
girl who had suffered from adhesions and a kidney ailment so that
she thought she might have a tumor, was credible evidence. She also
wore her usual clothes during her pregnancy and worked until the
day before her labor. Hence, her failure to accuse the defendant and
discuss her condition with him until the birth of the child was held
to be of no consequence. 333
A prior inconsistent statement by the complainant, a high school
girl, that she did not know who the father was and her failure to file
a paternity action when she discovered she was pregnant was held
to be satisfactorily explained by a desire on the part of the com-
plainant and defendant to conceal the matter from his parents. In
addition, the complainant had expressed a willingness to assume
the responsibility because she believed she was as much at fault as
was the defendant. 334
331 N4elson v. State, 210 Wis. 441, 245 N.W. 676 (1932).
332 255 Wis. 416, 39 N.W.2d 399 (1949).
333 State v. Willing, 259 Wis. 395, 48 N.W.2d 236 (1951).
33 State ex rel. Burns v. Vernon, 26 Wis.2d 563, 133 N.W.2d 292 (1965).
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Other jurisdictions have also considered significant the failure of
the complainant to accuse the defendant until shortly before the
child's birth when there-was prior opportunity to do so,3 3' but have
considered such failure to be of no consequence where circumstances
were such that it could not be expected that the complainant would
or could do so."',
CREDIBILITY
Because the only persons who can speak from actual personal
knowledge as to the factum probandum 7 are the parties, the courts
fully recognize that determinations of paternity cases stand or fall
upon the credibility of the parties. 338 The judge's or jury's task to
pass upon the relative weight and credibility of the parties' testi-
mony is peculiarly difficult and important, The usual considerations
of interest, demeanor upon the witness stand, opportunity for ob-
servation and knowledge of the matters and things given in evidence
by them, bias or prejudice of witnesses, clearness or lack of clear-
ness of recollections, and inherent reasonableness or improbability
of the testimony are to be weighed by the trier, as well as all other
facts which, by the experience of mankind, tend to support or dis-
credit the testimony of witnesses.
When the case is tried to a jury, it is within the exclusive pro-
vince of the jury to determine the credibility of the evidence introduced.
According to familiar rules the resolution of conflicting evidence and
the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to determine.339 It is not
the duty of the jury to count the witnesses but to weigh the testi-
mony of each.3 40 Hence, it is competent for the jury to believe the
testimony of the complainant as against the defendant and his wit-
nesses. 34 1 A rather graphic example of the pperation of this rule is
an Iowa case in which the court held that it was competent for the
jury to believe the complainant's testimony that she had intercourse
only with the defendant, despite the fact that three other men testi-
fied that they had intercourse with her during the conceptive
period. 42
335 Armstrong v. Watrous, 138 Conn. 127, 82 A.2d 800 (1951).
338 Seibert v. State, 133 Md. 309, 105 Atl. 161 (1918).
337 Douglas v. State, 43 Wis. 392 (1877).
338 State v. Buss, 273 Wis. 134, 76 N.W.2d 541 (1955).
339 Olson v. Holway, 152 Wis. 1, 139 N.W. 422 (1913) ; Adams v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co., 89 Wis. 645, 62 N.W. 525 (1895) ; Roberts v. State, 84 Wis. 361, 54
N.W. 580 (1893); McCoy v. Milwaukee Street Ry., 82 Wis. 215, 52 N.W. 93(1892); Sieber v. Amunson, 78 Wis. 679, 47 N.W. 1126 (1891); Telford v.
Frost, 76 Wis. 172, 44 N.W. 835 (1890) ; Shekey v. Eldredge, 71 Wis. 538, 37
N.W. 820 (1888) ; McClellan v. State, 66 Wis. 335, 28 N.W. 347 (1886) ; Bier-
bach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wis. 208, 11 N.W. 514 (1882).340 Van Doran v. Armstrong, 28 Wis. 236 (1871).
341 Bookhout v. State, 66 Wis. 415, 28 N.W. 179 (1886).342 Loggins v. Bundy, 248 Iowa 153, 79 N.W.2d 545 (1956).
[Vol. 50
PATERNITY CASES
On occasions the Wisconsin Supreme Court has exercised its
discretionary power under section 251.09 to reverse a finding of pater-
nity because the complainant's evidence was so inherently improbable
that as a matter of law reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
existed.34 3 In each case when the verdict was upset because of the
inherent improbability of the complainant's evidence, a combination of
facts was involved, and there was always some other substantial or
positive evidence which militated against the credence of the complain-
ant's testimony.
Some of the facts which the courts found difficult to believe in
combination with others were-that only one act was committed,
that prior to such act there was only a casual relationship between
the parties, that the complainant had been virtuous prior thereto,
and that the circumstances under which the act was alldgedly com-
mitted were such that they were difficult to believe. An example of
the latter is testimony that the act took place in the presence of
other people in a car who were unaware of its occurrence.
The mere fact that there be contradictions or uncertainties as to
the details of minor matters in the testimony of the parties does not
preclude the jury from believing or disbelieving a party's testimony
concerning the central fact of intercourse,344 nor is it fatal that the
complainant is not absolutely certain in her testimony as to when
pregnancy occurred if there had been repeated acts of intercourse
between the parties.3 45 It has been held not to be error to permit
the complainant to correct her testimony as to the date of inter-
course after hearing the testimony on the part of the defense, par-
ticularly where there is no claim of prejudice by the defendant.346
Material prior inconsistent statements made .in the preliminary
examination may be offered to challenge complainant's credibil-
ity,3 4 7 but she has the right to offer evidence to explain prior incon-
sistent statements. 348
Considerable doubt may be cast upon a complainant's testimony
when she repeatedly and positively, but erroneously, fixes a signi-
ficant date from which she determines the time of other material
events. In Vogel v. State349 a verdict of guilty was upset partly for the
reason that the complainant mistakenly fixed the date of a party,
at which there was opportunity and suspicious circumstances im-
3 State v. Van Patten, 236 Wis. 186, 294 N.W. 560 (1940) ; Schuh v. State, 221
Wis. 180, 266 N.W. 234 (1936); Hughes v. State, 219 Wis. 9, 261 N.VWA. 670
(1935) ; Jacobsen v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 237 N.W. 142 (1931).
34 Douglas v. State, 43 Wis. 392 (1877).
345 Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887).
346 Humphrey v. State, 78 Wis. 569,47 N.W. 836 (1891).
34 Vogel v. State, 220 Wis. 677, 265 N.W. 567 (1936).
348 State ex rel. Burns v. Vernon, 26 Wis.2d 563, 133 N.W.2d 292 (1965).
349 220 Wis. 677, 265 N.W. 567 (1936).
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plying intercourse with another, at a time outside the conceptive
period, when the actual date of the party placed it within the con-
ceptive period of the child whose paternity was at issue.
Because of the critical importance of the credibility of the wit-
nesses, counsel will seek to create an inference of untruthfulness as
to the main issue by demonstrating the witness is in error on other
points. It is a well established rule that a witness cannot be im-
peached as to collateral matters.3 50 Because the meaning of collater-
alness cannot always be sharply delineated, the matter is controlled
by the discretion of the court.3,51 A fact is not collateral, if it could
have been offered in testimony for any purpose independent of the
contradiction. Hence, contradiction may be sought of any facts im-
mediately connected with the subject of the inquiry, or which could
otherwise be received for the purpose of impeaching some specific
testimonial quality of the witness sought to be contradicted. 352
Proof that a witness has given erroneous statements on many
minor points may strengthen the inference that his testimony is un-
trustworthy as to the main fact in issue, but such pursuit will be
terminated by the court when it appears that the matters sought to
be contradicted are trifling, create confusion to the main issue, or
will lead to the trial of innumerable irrelevant issues.
Frequently, the elementary rule-if a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of prior inconsistent statements, a proper found-
ation must be laid-is overlooked or purposefully ignored by coun-
sel. The witness must first be asked if the statement was made at a
certain time and place for the purpose of directing the witness's at-
tention to the statement. If the witness denies the statement, proof
may be offered of the precise statement made. The witness must
have the privilege of admitting it just as it occurred.3 53 Failure by
the court to enforce the rule upon timely objection opens the door to
permitting the jury to believe the existence of facts as to culpa-
tory statements or improper associations with other men which in
fact may not exist at all.
354
The pecuniary interest of a litigant generally is a strong induce-
350 Madler v. Pozorski, 124 Wis. 477, 102 N.W. 892 (1905) ; Illinois Steel Co. v.
Jeka, 123 Wis. 419, 101 N.W. 399 (1905) ; Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160,
106 N.W. 237 (1906); Waterman v. Chi. & Alton R.R., 82 Wis. 613, 52 N.WAr.
247 (1892).
351 Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 Pa. Super. 403, 111 A.2d 151 (1955); Common-
wealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 19 A.2d 288 (1941).
3 See III WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1003-06 (3rd ed. 1940).
3 Sieber v. Amunson, 78 Wis. 679, 47 N.W. 1126 (1891); Ferguson v. Truax,
136 Wis. 637, 118 N.W. 251 (1908); Hunter v. Gibbs, 79 Wis. 70, 48 N.W.
257 (1891); Stone v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 70 Wis. 585, 36 N.W. 248
(1888) ; Dufresne v. Weise, 46 Wis. 290, 1 N.W. 59 (1879).
54 See Rindskopf v. State, 34 Wis. 217 (1874).
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ment which may actuate the party to testify falsely.35 5 Older cases
considered the prosecutrix as an involuntary witness for the state
with no pecuniary interest. Nevertheless, instructions that both
parties were not of equal credibility were refused, because such
determinations are solely for the jury. 56
Certainly, it is true that the defendant has a primary and direct
pecuniary interest, but the realities of life do not relieve the mother
completely from all financial responsibility to and expenditures for
an illegitimate child. The mother is the natural custodian of the
child and frequently must supplement the child's support from her
own means. 3 5 7 It has been said quite succinctly that while the bear-
ing of an illegitimate child is a most unfortunate experience for the
complainant, the accusation of responsibility is a most serious mat-
ter to the defendant. If a defendant is guilty of having sexual rela-
tions with the complainant, but is not the father, he should be
punished by other means than by being named the father.3 58 Several
cases reflect the notion that it is incredulous that a complainant
would willfully name an innocent man as the defendant.35 9
The propriety of making the jury aware of the fact that the child
is or is likely to become a public charge has arisen in a number of
jurisdictions. Frequently, the defendant will try to elicit informa-
tion from the complainant implying that the complainant was forced
to name someone by the relief agency from whom she sought as-
sistance.3 60 Several jurisdictions have permitted an instruction that
the purpose of the proceeding was to compel the father to support
the child and indemnify the public against the burden of supporting
the child.3"' These decisions have been justified in that the instruc-
tions are true statements of law and that possible prejudice to the
defendant can be eliminated by a precautionary instruction that an
innocent man should not be shouldered with an unjust burden to
relieve the taxpayer. Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio have held such
an instruction to be prejudicial.362
355 Kenney v. State, 74 Wis. 260, 42 N.W. 213 (1889) ; McClellan v. State, 66
Wis. 335, 28 N.W. 347 (1886).
356 Roberts v. State, 84 Wis. 361, 54 N.W. 580 (1893).
357 Francken v. State, 190 Wis. 424, 209 N.W. 766 (1926).
358 Gillis v. State, 206 Wis. 150, 238 N.W. 804 (1931).
350 Dingman v. State, 48 Wis. 485, 4 N.W. 668 (1880); McClellan v. State, 66
Wis. 335, 28 N.W. 347 (1886).
300 Ford v. Dist. of Columbia, 96 A2d 277 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
361 People v. Finks, 343 Mich. 304, 72 N.W.2d 250 (1955) ; Ford v. District of
Columbia, 102 A.2d 838 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1954); State ex rel. Feagins
v. Conn., 160 Kan. 370, 162 P.2d 76 (1945); State v. Cotter, 167 Minn. 263,
209 N.W. 4 (1926); Lawhead v. State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 Pac. 376 (1924);
State v. Pratt, 40 Iowa 631 (1875).
362 Menn v. State, 132 Wis. 61, 112 N.W. 38 (1907); Cunningham v. State, 65
Ind. 377 (1879); State ex reL. Freeman v. Morris, 156 Ohio State 333,
102 N.E.2d 450 (1951).
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In accordance with general rules, the credibility of a party or
witness may be impeached by evidence that his reputation for truth
and general character is bad. 363 Furthermore, the impeaching wit-
ness may be asked whether, upon such general reputation, lie would
believe the party sought to be impeached upon oath.364 Evidence of
only general reputation for truth and veracity or character is admis-
sible as distinguished from particular acts of immorality or wrong-
doing which might reflect upon the integrity of the witness.36 5 Once
the general reputation of the witness for truth and veracity or char-
acter is attacked, the witness may offer proof that his general repu-
tation is good.3 66
Wisconsin is in accord with the general rule that the prose-
cutrix's reputation for chastity is inadmissable. 36 7 It is said that the
complainant's character for chastity is already impeached by the
fact that she is a complainant in a paternity action. If character is
meant to imply general reputation this is, of course, not true be-
cause all it proves is her want of chastity in one instance. The true
reason is that the want of chastity is not material to the witness's
character for truth and veracity. Reputation, of course, is evidence
of the net expression of a multitude of personal opinions of the wit-
ness's disposition for a particular quality. Because the issue in a
paternity case is the paternity of the child in question, evidence of
unchasteness by way of general reputation or specific acts is not
admissible, unless it bears a definite relationship to the probability
of sexual intercourse during the conceptive period. The rule is other-
wise in rape, seduction, or assault where the issues are different.368
When paternity cases were held to be quasi-criminal, it had been
held that it was error to exclude testimony that the defendant's
reputation for chastity and morality was good, even though his
general good character or reputation had not been impeached.369
The ruling rested upon the criminal nature of the proceedings.
An exception to the rule that only general reputation, as dis-
tinguished from particular acts, can be proven is in the case of a
prior conviction of a crime. Section 885.19 makes persons convicted of
363 Suckow v. State, 122 Wis. 156, 99 N.W. 440 (1904) ; State v. Knight, 118
Wis. 473, 95 N.W. 390 (1903) ; Bookhout v. State, 66 Wis. 415, 28 N.W. 179(1886); Wallis v. White, 58 Wis. 26, 15 N.W. 767 (1883); Wilson v. State,
3 Wis. 798 (1854).
364 Wilson v. State, supra note 363.
s State v. Baker, 16 Wis.2d 364, 114 N.W.2d 426 (1961) : Corti %v. Cooney, 191
Wis. 464, 211 N.W. 274 (1926) ; Duffy v. Radke, 138 Wis. 38, 119 N.W. 811
(1909) ; Ketchingham v. State, 6 Wis. 417 (1857).
306 State v. Wrosch, 262 Wis. 104, 53 N.W.2d 779 (1952) ; Johnson v. State, 129
Wis. 146, 108 N.W. 55 (1906).
361 Bookhout v. State, 66 Wis. 415, 28 N.W. 179 (1886) ; Duffies v. State, 7 Wis.
567 (1858) ; Annot., 104 A.L.R. 84 (1936) ; Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 742 (1955).
308 Cleveland v. State, 211 Wis. 565, 248 N.W. 408 (1933).
109 Windahl v. State, 189 Wis. 424, 207 N.W. 694 (1926).
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criminal offenses competent to testify, but permits his conviction to be
proven to affect his credibility. The proof may not go beyond proof of
conviction,3 70 unless the door is opened by the adverse party.371
Interrogation as to the number of convictions is permissible, 372 but
only evidence of convictions are admissible. Evidence of arrests,373
charges, 374 or jailings375 is admissible.
Certain language of the Court in Ray v. State,3 6 a paternity case
which concerned a juvenile complainant, is capable of the construc-
tion that evidence of the complainant's involvement in four juven-
ile court proceedings was received to impeach her but that testi-
mony of the nature of the proceedings was excluded. An examina-
tion of the record in the case indicates that the evidence of the in-
volvement was actually excluded, even though the supreme court
made reference thereto. At the time section 48.07(3) provided
that the disposition of a child in juvenile court shall not be admissable
against the child in any proceeding in any other court. The present
statute377 provides that no adjudication under the Children's Code
shall be deemed a conviction and such shall not be admissible as evi-
dence against the child in any proceedings in any other court. Thus, it
appears that adjudications under the Children's Code are not admissible
as evidence-of prior convictions.
There is occasion in paternity cases to apply the rule of falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus-false in one thing, false in everything.
The rule is now set forth as a uniform instruction . 3 7 The rule sim-
ply provides that the trier may disregard all of the testimony of a
witness, except insofar as it is supported by other credible evidence,
if the trier becomes satisfied that a witness has wilfully testified
falsely as to any material fact.37 9 To warrant giving the instruction,
the trial court must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidentiary
basis to show there was wilfull false swearing to a material fact.
It already has been observed that the parties in paternity actions
frequently attempt to clean up their stories to some degree to make
it more socially acceptable according to their individual beliefs. It
370 State v. Adams, 257 Wis. 433, 43 N.W.2d 446 (1949); State v. Raether, 259
Wis. 391, 48 N.W.2d 483 (1951).
371 State v. Roberson, 254 Wis. 595, 36 N.W.2d 677 (1949) ; see State v. Kopacka,
260 Wis. 505, 50 N.W.2d 917 (1952).
372 State v. Ketchun, 263 Wis. 82, 56 N.W2d 531 (1953).
373 State v. Raether, 259 Wis. 391, 48 N.W.2d 483 (1951).
374 McKesson v. Sherman, 51 Wis. 303, 8 N.W. 200 (1881).375 Patten Paper Co. Limited v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 104 Wis.
24, 83 N.W. 1119 (1899).
376 231 Wis. 169, 285 N.W. 374 (1939).
377 Wis. STAT. §48.38 (1965).
378 Wis. Jury Instructions-Civil, Part I, 405.
379 Beauregard v. State, 146 Wis. 280, 131 N.W. 347 (1911) ; Miller v. State, 139
Wis. 57, 119 N.WAl. 850 (1909); Blankavag v. Badger Box & Lumber Co.,
136 Wis. 380, 117 N.W. 852 (1908); Suckow v. State, 122 Wis. 156, 99 N.W.
440 (1904); Allen v. Murray, 87 Wis. 41, 57 N.W. 979 (1894).
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is wilfull false swearing to material facts which brings the rule into
operation and not discrepancies, conflicts, or contradictions which
are manifestly honest mistakes due to faulty observation, imperfect
recollection, or mistaken impressions of facts.
3 0
A final evidentiary consideration relating to the credibility of
the parties in paternity suits involves the failure to produce a wit-
ness who could testify to a material fact. It is a well established rule
that if a party fails to produce the testimony of an available witness
to a material fact of the case; and it would naturally appear in the
interest of that party to produce him, it may be inferred that the
evidence which he would give would be unfavorable to the party
failing to produce, unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the
failure to produce the witness.3 81 Although there may not be a wit-
ness to the act, frequently there is a witness to critical corrobora-
tive circumstantial evidence. Many of these cases must be tried in-
so far as counsel are concerned on a low budget, but it is most help-
ful to the trier if there is corroborative proof of key circumstantial
evidence supporting the respective party's contentions.
PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY
Because of the intense battle to destroy the credibility of the
other party's testimony, the overzealousness of counsel sometimes
causes them to run the risk of committing prejudicial error. This is
perhaps more true in paternity cases than others.
The court's role in this regard is set forth in Rubin v. State. 382 It
was there said that reasonable latitude should be allowed for cross-
examination, but it is the plain duty of the court to intercede even
without objection of proponent's counsel when there is an attempt
to browbeat, insult, or intimidate a witness. Questions which inject
unfair insinuations, comment upon the witness's testimony, or abuse
the witness are not to be tolerated. 383
Thus, a question which sought to elicit the fact that another
child had been born to the complainant six months after she was
married was held prejudicial, because it had no probative effect
upon the question in issue.38 4 Similarly, it was held that a question
as to whether the complainant had been an inmate of a brothel was
held improper, when it referred to a period which was far removed
from the conceptive period.38 5 Persistent cross-examination calcu-
380 Pumorlo v. Merrill, 125 Wis. 102, 103 N.W. 464 (1905).
381 Bowen v. Industrial Comm'n., 239 Wis. 306, 1 N.W.2d 77 (1941); Booth v.
Frankenstein, 209 Wis. 362, 245 N.W. 191 (1932).
382 192 Wis. 1, 211 N.W. 926 (1927).
383 Groling v. Goltz, 267 Wis. 390, 66 N.W.2d 195 (1954); Scarfield v. Rudy,
266 Wis. 530, 64 N.W.2d 189 (1954) ; Corti v. Cooney, 191 Wis. 464, 211 N.W.
274 (1926) ; Crawford v. Christian, 102 Wis. 51, 78 N.W. 406 (1899).
384 Jacobsen v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 237 N.W. 142 (1931).
385 Duffies v. State, 7 Wis. 567 (1858).
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lated to show a pattern of loose morality just prior to the conceptive
period, despite objections sustained by the court, may constitute
the basis for a mistrial. 3 6
Insinuations that the defendant is rich are improper.38 7 Although
the defendant's earnings, savings, or financial condition are irrele-
vant to the issue of paternity, timely objections must be made to
these questions.3 8 These matters are gone into at a separate hear-
ing after there has been an adjudication of paternity.
The extent to which the court should allow testimony of the de-
tails of act of intercourse presents some problems of delicacy.
In a Washington case it was said that evidence of the intimate and
lurid details regarding sex play and acts of intercourse is "highly
dubious, palpably of interest only to the morbidly curious, but other-
wise not material. '" 3 9 The trial judge has the task of deciding when
such evidence no longer serves the pursuit of determining credi-
bility.
The propriety of permitting the mother to hold the child while
in the courtroom has been considered several times in Wisconsin.
In an early case it was held that the child should not be exhibited
to the jury as evidence for the purpose of showing its likeness to the
defendant. 3 0 In the next case it was determined that merely per-
mitting the complaining witness to hold her baby in her arms while
giving her testimony was not error, because there was no attempt
to offer the baby in evidence or exhibit it to the jury.3 9' In a rela-
tively recent case, it was held that the child's presence in the court-
room before the trial commenced was not prejudicial, because the
child was removed from the room before the jury was made aware
of the nature of the case.392 In these jurisdictions in which evidence
of resemblance is held admissible, the presence of the child in the
courtroom is not objectionable.393
It would appear that the general case law does not require the
separation of the mother and the child while the mother testifies or
is in court, as long as the child is not informally exhibited or used
to excite the prejudice of the jury.394 Better practice dictates that
the child should be excluded from the courtroom.
386 State ex rel. Stollberg v. Crittenden, 29 Wis.2d 413, 139 N.W.2d 94 (1966).
387 Jacobsen v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 237 N.W. 142 (1931).
388 State ex rel. Sarnowski v. Fox, 19 Wis.2d 68, 119 N.W.2d 451 (1963).
3s9 State v. Taylor, 39 Wash2d 751, 238 P.2d 1189, 1191 (1951).
390 Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84,24 N.W. 489 (1885).
391 Johnson v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.VW. 674 (1907).
392 State ex rel. Sarnowski v. Fox, 19 Wis.2d 68, 119 N.W%.2d 451 (1963).
393 State ex rel. Dickerson v. Tokstad, 139 Ore. 63, 8 P.2d 86 (1932) ; See cases
in Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97, 143 (1924).
3 94 Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97, 144-147 (1924).
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INSTRUCTIONS
A standard instruction for cases involving an unmarried wom-
an 395 has been prepared. Its use has been generally accepted as writ-
ten, although some courts make minor variations. The standard in-
structions have not been the subject of review by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
It is the practice of many courts to give most of the instruction
as to the paternity issue at the very outset of the trial as a prelimi-
nary instruction. At the very outset the jury is told that the com-
plaining witness was delivered of a child on whatever date the child
was born and that the mother was unmarried at the time. Then the
jurors are informed that the complainant alleges that the defendant
is the father of the child, that he denies such charge, and that it will
be for them to determine from the evidence and according to the in-
structions of the court whether the defendant is the father. It is
made clear that the sole issue is whether the defendant is the father
of the child and that he is not charged with merely having sexual
relations with the complainant.39 6 They are told that the sexual in-
tercourse between the parties, if any there was, is only incidental
to the issue of paternity as is the chastity of the complaining wit-
ness.
After the form of the verdict is read, the jury is advised, if such
is undisputed, that the testimony will establish that the weight of
the child was in excess of 5Y2 pounds at birth. Consequently, it is
presumed that the child was a full term child and to have been con-
ceived within a span of time extending from 240 days to 300 days
before its birth. The jury is advised that it is presumed therefore
that the child was conceived between whatever the specific dates
happen to be.3 97 The jurors are then cautioned that before they can
find the defendant to be the father they must be satisfied by the de-
gree of proof required that the defendant and the complainant had
sexual intercourse within this period of time and that she did not
have sexual intercourse with any other man at a time which could
have resulted in such conception.3 9s If there is evidence that some-
one other than the defendant had intercourse with the complainant
during the conceptive period but was excluded by a blood test, then
there must be added language to the instruction to make it clear
395 Wis. Jury Instructions-Criminal 2010.
396 Baker v. State, 47 Wis. 111, 2 N.W. 110 (1879).
397 It is error to advise the jury that the average period of gestation is 280 days
with a margin of ten days either way, when the only medical testimony was
that although the average is 280 days the period may vary between 230 to
320 days. State v. Van Patten, 236 Wis. 186, 294 N.W. 560 (1940).
398 Johnson v State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N.W. 674 (1907) ; Baker v. State, 69 Wis.
32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887) ; Daegling v. State, 56 Wis. 586, 14 N.W. 593 (1883).
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that the reference to the "other man" is someone other than the one
who has been excluded by blood tests.
Because of the importance of credibility, many courts, as part of
the preliminary instructions, forewarn the jury of its duty in this
regard. Usually the factors bearing upon credibility are stated for
the guidance of the jurors at this point.
At the conclusion of the arguments by counsel, the jury is in-
structed in full. In addition to what had been previously covered,
the jury is instructed that it is not necessary that the complainant
prove the exact date on which the child was conceived, but that an
act of sexual intercourse with the defendant must be proven to have
occurred on such a date which will satisfy it by the proof required
that the child is the result of sexual intercourse with the defend-
ant.399 Such an instruction is erroneous, if there is no evidence of
intercourse except as to a specific date; and complainant's testimony
is positive as to that day and excludes all others.400
Generally, the instruction on credibility is reported, but it is
given in its full form at this time. Of course, an instruction on bur-
den of proof to the effect that the jury must be satisfied or con-
vinced to a reasonable certainty by a clear and satisfactory pre-
ponderance of the evidence is essential. A final requirement is an in-
struction that a five-sixths verdict is sufficient.401
If the child is not a full term child by virtue of the fact that its
weight is less than 5/2 pounds, or there is undisputed medical evi-
dence to the contrary, the presumption as to time of conception
drops out of the case.
If the mother was married so that the presumption of legitimacy
applies, the first issue which must be determined is whether the
husband was not the father. Consequently, the jury is instructed
that if the child was born while the complainant was the lawful wife
of a specified man, she has the burden of proving by a clear and
satisfactory preponderance of the evidence that the husband is not
the father. In addition the jury is advised that it may consider the
testimony relating to whether or not the complainant's husband had
access to the complainant during the conceptive period under cir-
cumstances in which sexual intercourse could have occurred or was
entirely absent, together with all other testimony which bears on
this issue. If the complainant fails to satisfy the burden as to this
prior issue, the jury cannot go to the second question which asks
whether the defendant-is the father.
39 State v. Van Patten, 236 Wis. 186, 294 N.W. 560 (1940) ; Stresney v. State
ex rel. Bean, 186 Wis. 214, 202 N.W. 334 (1925); State ex reL. Dewey v.
Kibbe, 186 Wis. 210, 202 N.W. 333 (1925).400 Oenn v. State, 132 Wis. 61, 112 N.W. 38 (1907).
401 WIS. STATS. §§52.45, 270.25 (1965).
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It has been previously noted that several of the earlier cases in-
dicated that it was improper to instruct the jurors that the com-
plainant and defendant were of equal credibility, because such would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of the jury's province. 40 2 Never-
theless, it has been held not to be error to simply instruct the jury
that insofar as pecuniary interests are concerned the parties do not
stand equal.
40 3
An instruction that the interests of "the state and county to be
relieved from expense by reason of this illegitimate child was at
stake, and therefore 'the case is equally important to both sides,'"
has been characterized as a very doubtful proposition.4 4
An instruction in which the court stated that in regard to minor
matters about which there was conflicting testimony, the prosecu-
trix might be mistaken, but as to her testimony of having sexual
intercourse with the defendant she was either telling the truth or
not, was held to submit the credibility of the complainant to the
jury fairly.40 5
The function of instructions are to state the issues of fact and
principles of law applied. Therefore, a charge which asks the jury to
consider whether it was likely that a woman would falsely charge
a man if such were not true, or, if she would, would she not make
a better choice, is prejudicial. Such an instruction constitutes a
forcible argument on behalf of the complainant and invades the
province of the jury.400
If the defendant exercises his right against self-incrimination, he
is entitled to an instruction concerning his failure to testify, but he
must make such requests.
40 7
ARGUMENT
The usual civil rules concerning argument of counsel to the jury
apply.
In an early paternity case, objections were sustained when
counsel went outside the record by alluding to a prior trial involving
the parties.40 8 Such was held not to be prejudicial, but the court
outlined the general rules governing such remarks. It was observed
that frequently some fact or circumstance occurs in a trial which
never becomes a part of the record but nevertheless is open to com-
ment by counsel. Opposing counsel may indulge in proper comment
402 Roberts v. State, 84 Wis. 361, 54 N.W. 580 (1893) ; McClellan v. State, 66
Wis. 335, 28 N.W. 347 (1886).
403 Kenney v. State, 74 Wis. 260, 42 N.W. 213 (1889).
404 Menn v. State, 132 Wis. 61, 112 N.W. 38 (1907).
405 Douglass v. State, 43 Wis. 392 (1877).
406 Dingman v. State, 48 Wis. 485, 4 N.W. 668 (1879).
407 Johns v. State, 14 Wis.2d 119, 109 N.W.2d 490 (1960).
408 Baker v. State, 69 'is. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887).
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thereupon, but the matter rests in the broad discretion of the trial
court.
A more frequent problem arises when there are appeals to sym-
pathy, passion, or prejudice. No clear line of demarcation can be
drawn between fair and unfair argument. Some comfort, if not guid-
ance, is given to trial courts in Fields v. Creek4°9 by the following
language:
It is difficult to lay down precise standards which will suc-
cessfully separate fair argument from unfair argument. We
are not prepared to strike down all colorful, forensic thrusts
before the jury. Oral argument to the jury need not be con-
fined to the sterile reiteration of the testimony which was pre-
sented. Counsel have the right to analyze and exhort. As
long ago as 1878, this court recognized that counsel in argu-
ment should be given 'the very fullest freedom of speech.'
Brown v. Swineford (1878), 44 Wis. 282, 293.
There is a point when enthusiastic advocacy becomes an
appeal to prejudice. It is the burden of the trial court to
make sure the arguments do not exceed the bounds of fair-
ness.
When counsel abuse their privilege of legitimate argument, the
trial court has the duty to immediately and vigorously intercede on
its own motion.
410
It has been previously observed that testimony insinuating that
the defendant was rich or evidence of his financial condition is in-
admissible.41 Hence arguments calculated to thrust the burden of
support on defendant because of his ability to pay regardless of his
responsibility are improper.41 Argument which tells the jury that
the state will be compelled to support the child if the defendant is
not required to do so and that the jurors as taxpayers would suffer
is improper.41  Such a remark may be sufficient to justify a new
trial in a close case,41 4 but might be cured by an instruction to dis-
regard it in other situations.41 5
There are no Wisconsin cases which discuss the right of counsel
to comment upon the defendant's failure to testify. Generally, the
409 Fields v. Creek, 21 Wis.2d 562, 124 N.W.2d 599 (1963).
41OPecor v. Home Indemnity, 234 Wis. 407, 291 N.W. 313 (1940); Markowitz
v. MiIw. E. R. & L. Co., 230 Wis. 312, 284 N.W. 31 (1939) ; Hanley v. Milw.
E. R. & L. Co., 220 Wis. 281, 263 N.W. 638 (1936); Georgeson v. Nielsen,
218 Wis. 180, 260 N.W. 461 (1935); Hanes v. Hermsen, 205 Wis. 16, 236
N.W. 646 (1931) ; Rissling v. Milw. E. L. & R. Co., 203 Wis. 554, 234 N.W.
879 (1931) ; Masterson v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 102 Wis. 571, 78 N.W. 757 (1899);
Andrews v. Chi., Milw. & St. P. Ry., 96 Wis. 348, 71 N.W. 372 (1897).
411 Jacobsen v. State, 205 Wis. 304, 237 N.W. 142 (1931); State ex reL. Sarnow-
ski v. Fox, 19 Wis2d 68, 119 N.W.2d 451 (1962).
412 Menn v. State, 132 Wis. 61, 112 N.W. 38 (1907).
413 People v. Freitas, 34 Cal. App.2d 684, 94 P.2d 397 (1939) ; State ex rel. Burg-
hart v. Haslebacher, 125 Ore. 389, 266 Pac. 900 (1928).
414 People v. Freitas, supra note 413.415 People v. Haslebacher, 125 Ore. 389, 266 Pac. 900 (1928).
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defendant realizes that his silence will be taken by the trier to be an
admission of guilt despite his constitutional right not to incrimin-
ate himself. Consequently, it is unusual for the defendant not to take
the witness stand.
In Wisconsin a witness in a civil proceeding may invoke the
right of self-incrimination to shield himself from criminal liability
but not from civil liability.416 The rule has been applied in paternity
matters to a witness as distinguished from a party.417 Of course, the
act which gives rise to a paternity action involves a sex crime of at
least fornication.
Comment by the prosecutor in oral argument in a criminal case
concerning the defendant's failure to testify is a violation of the de-
fendant's right to freedom from self-incrimination. 4 18 It is error
which may be prejudicial, 419 or merely improper and cured by an
instruction. 420 Merely to sustain an objection to the comment is in-
sufficient; the court must promptly condemn the statement and ad-
vise the jury of the defendant's rights and admonish the jury to
disregard the remark.4 1 Several jurisdictions have held such com-
ment to be error without regard to whether paternity proceedings
were civil or criminal.
422
A putative father cannot be compelled in Ohio to testify against
himself, but his failure to testify may be considered or be the subject
of comment in argument. Paternity proceedings in Ohio are quasi-
criminal, and the Ohio Constitution permits such comment and con-
sideration in criminal proceedings. 423
In Georgia, the defendant's failure in a criminal case to testify
cannot be made a matter of comment. If the defendant does how-
ever testify in a paternity suit and fails to deny a material fact
brought out in the evidence, comment may be made thereon.424 The
states of Ohio, Oklahoma, and Kansas permit comment upon the
failure of the defendant to testify on the basis that paternity pro-
ceedings are civil.4
25
It would seem that if a party may invoke the right against self-
incrimination, he should also be protected from comment which, if
416 Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 266 (1913).
417 Poplowski v. State ex rel. Lewandowski, 194 Wis. 385, 216 N.W. 488 (1927).418 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
419 Pleau v. State, 255 Wis. 362, 38 N.W.2d 496 (1948); Martin v. State, 79
Wis. 165, 48 N.V. 119 (1891).
420 Dunn v. State, 118 Wis. 82, 94 N.W. 646 (1903) ; Haffner v. State, 176 Wis.
471, 187 N.W. 173 (1922).
421 State v. Jackson, 219 Wis. 13, 261 N.WV. 732 (1935).
422 People v. Stoeckl, 347 Mich. 1, 78 N.W.2d 640 (1956).
423 State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, 30 Ohio2d 394, 145, N.E.2d 162 (1957).
424 Tolbert v. State, 12 Ga. App. 685, 78 S.E. 131 (1913).
425 State er rel. Raydel v. Raible, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 356, 117 N.E.2d 480 (1954);
Codapohy v. State, 178 Okla. 61, 61 P.2d 677 (1936) ; State v. Wright, 140 Kan.
679, 38 P.2d 135 (1934).
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permitted, would make his utilization of the privilege prejudicial in
a civil case. As a practical matter the same effect can be accom-
plished by forcing the defendant to invoke the right. As distinguish-
ed from a criminal case, the defendant in a paternity case may be
called adversely or he may be asked on cross examination whether
he had intercourse with the complainant within the conceptive period
even though such is not within the scope of the direct examina-
tion.4 6
It is not improper for the district attorney or corporation counsel
to inform the jury that the evidence in the case has convinced him
beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant is the father of the
child. 42
7
Although in an old case, comment in argument upon the re-
semblance of the child to the defendant was not held to be preju-
dicial, 428 such would now be held to be improper unless evidence
of such resemblance were admissible under the rules of evidence
and had been made part of the record.
CONCLUSION
The issues are simple. It is hoped that this article will provide
some aids and ideas so that these matters can be more ably tried.
Two important matters which every lawyer must consider when
confronted with a paternity trial have not been discussed in this
article, because they are outside its scope. First, he must plan the
intelligent use of his client's right to a preliminary examination of
the complainant. Second, the possibility of a reasonable settlement
must always be weighed carefully. If a settlement is possible, it is
essential that both counsel and client understand the exclusive statu-
tory procedure and restrictions placed upon such agreements, the
fact that such may be entered without an admission of paternity
upon the part of the defendant, and the consequences in case of de-
fault.429
Despite whatever assistance this article may be by way of sug-
gestions or statement of rules, the trial of a paternity case will con-
tinue to challenge the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of
both prosecutor and defense counsel in the ways of experiences of
life.
426 State ex rel. Burns v. Vernon, 26 Wis.2d 563, 133 N.W.2d 292 (1964).
427 Fuerstenberg v. State, 201 Wis. 574, 230 N.W. 628 (1930).
428 Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N.W. 52 (1887).
429 WIs. STATS. §§52.28-.30 (1965).
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